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THE REMILITARIZATION OF THE RHINELAND 
Yvonne Honeycutt Baldwin, M.A. 
Morehead State University, 1981 
On March 7, 1936, German troops reoccupied the 
Rhineland, an area which had been demilitarized by the 
Treaty of Versailles. The reoccuoation was carefully 
planned and .carried out by the German Chancellor, Adolph 
Hitler, against the advice of his General Staff. Hitler 
had evaluated the international situation and timed his 
Rhineland move precisely. The reactions of Great Bri-
tain and France to his rearmament program, the rein-
troduction of conscription, aDd Germany's departure from 
the League of Nations had convinced Hitler that his re-
visionist goals could be accomplished with a minimum of 
opposition from the western democracies. The Anglo-
German Naval Agreement indicated tacit British aoorov-
al of Germany's rearmament, in spite of the Versailles 
armaments limitations. The Abyssinian crisis had seri-
ously weakened Anglo-French solidarity, and Hitler took 
advantage of the disunity of the opposition to further 
his own designs. 
This caper deals with the weaken ing of the Euro-
pean structure which had been created by t h e Versail l es 
treaty and reaffirmed by the Locarn o pac t of 1925. Hit -
ler publicly denounced the "chains of Versai l les " and 
used the remilitarization of the Rhineland to break 
those chains . Only a firm reaction by Grea t Britain 
and France could have saved the structure. Why they 
failed to respond to this chall enge is the theme of t hi s 
paper . France, even though her own front i er was in-
volved, was so paralyzed by domestic unrest , po l itical 
paltering , diplomatic impotence and military i n effec-
tiveness that she could not respond. England preferred 
to negotiate and appease rather than adoot a resolute 
stance, and France followed the British lead. Both 
countries had been forewarned, but neither was ~repared 
when the crisis came. 
The remilitarization of the Rhineland was the / 
fir s t major indication of Hitler ' s revision ist olans, 
and had he been met with resolution and force by the 
western democracies , perhaps the tra~edy of Munich 
and possibly even of Poland and Wor l d War II could 
have been averted. Hitler' s early s uccesses confirmed 
him i n his belief that the western democracies could 
be bluffed and blackmailed into capitulation and led 
him to make increasingly harsh demands at the expense 
of Eastern Europe. The precedent for appeasement was 
set in 1936 when Great Britain agreed to German sov-
ereignty in the Rhineland, abandoned the Eastern Euro-
pean nations and thereby sealed the fate of Czechoslo-
vakia. 
Using The Times (London), the New York Times.and 
several news journals, I was. able to reconstruct some 
of the events bf 1935 and early .1936. The memoirs of 
Anthony Eden, Paul Reynau~ arid Albert Sneer provided 
some insight into the varying national points of view 
regarding the Rhineland occupation and German aggres-
sion. An inval~able source was found in a Ph.D. dis-
sertation by Aaron Goldman, "Crisis in the Rhineland," 
which provi:des a blow-by-blow account of the events 
surrounding the crisis. 
Once I had obtained the facts and delineated the 
events, I sought further interpretation as to the im-
pact of remilitarization upon Europe. Although I used 
a variety of sources, the most helpful was General 
(U.S. Army, retired) Telford Taylor's monumental study, 
Munich, the Price of Peace. 
I believe the remilitarization of the Rhineland 
clearly illustrates two historical lessons: that 
alliances a.re totally ineffective unless they are 
backed by a willingness to act and that appeasement 
of aggression can only lead to further capitulation. 
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On Saturday, March 7, 1936, Adolph Hitler sent 
German troops into the demilitarized zone of the 
Rhineland. By resuming the watch on the Rhine, he 
repudiated the Treaty of Versailles and the Pact of 
Locarno, exposed the weaknesses of the European al-
liance system and undermined the fragile peace of 
Europe. His actions precipitated the worst crisis 
' ' 
Great Britain and Fran:ce had·. faced · since World War 
I, and in effect, challenged them to another war. 
Why this challenge went unanswered is the theme of 
this '[)aper. 
The uncertainty and hesitation displayed by 
France in the face of the Rhineland crisis reflected 
the true state of the French nation. On the surface, 
France was a vigorous and strong democracy, safe be-
hind an invincible fortified line, and defended by a 
p·owerful military force. An intricate system of al-
liances made France the partner of the largest nation 
in Europe and the protector of a group of lesser Euro-
pean powers. Yet beneath the surface lay the reality 
of French political life. In France the fear of Com-
munism was just as pervasive as the fear of Fascism, 
and in many ways, more damaging. Domestic distrust 
1 
2 
of the Russians made the Franco-Soviet Pact unpopular 
in France and caused a decisive split in public opinion. 
This wasteful and sometimes violent cleavage between 
the right and left sapped the nation of its vitality 
and left it open to disorder. Largely because of in-
ternalprob,lems, the French government was stymied in its 
efforts to formulate a cohesive foreign policy, and con-
tinually demonstrated its inability to maintain a posi-
tion of leadership in international affairs. 
The remilitarizatfon of the Rhineland revealed 
similar circumstances in Great Britain and exposed the 
paradox inherent in British policy regarding Western 
Europe. For the sake of her own security, Britain 
could not allow an invasipn·of either France or Bel-
gium. But for the sake of peace, Great Britain, sup-
ported by public -opinion, could no longer guarantee 
the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland. Hhet;her by 
intuition, blind luck or diplomatic acumen, Hitler 
was able to capitalize on these weaknesses and fur-
ther his own designs. 
Many historians have argued that the Munich con-
ference of 1938 was the critical episode or turning 
point of the inter-war years. They maintain that the 
po1icy of appeasell)ent: followed by Great Britain and 
3 
France at that critical juncture resulted in World 
War II. The purpose of this paper is to show that 
the pivotal point was earlier,in March of 1936, and 
that if Hitler was to have been stopped, the attempt 
should have been made then. 
The remilitarization of the Rhineland and the Bri-
tish and French reaction to it clearly illustrate the 
appeasement, wishful thinking and self-delusion of 
the inter-war years. These attitudes contributed to 
a decline of the chances for peace in Europe and sim-
' ultaneously created a situation which made war more 
likely. The Rhineland crisis occurred early enough 
in Hitler's career that a firm reaction to his aggres-
sion might have placed an obs.tacle in his path, and 
by impeding.his initial success, perhaps have led to 
an entirely different kind of Europe than that which 
existed from 1939-19~5. 
The failure of the Western powers to oppose Hit-
ler's remilitarization of the Rhineland confirmed him 
in his belief that France and Britain could be bluffed 
and blackmailed into further acquiescence by the threat 
of war, provided that the threat remained no empty ges-
ture. Britain 1 and France each looked to the other for 
reinforcement of weakness rather than confirmation of 
4 
strong resolve, and what they would not do from a 
position of strength in 1936, they would subsequently 
attempt to do from a position of weakness at Munich 
in 1938. 
CHAPTER I 
VERSAILLES, LOCARNO AND THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE 
Although the Allies were victorious in World War 
I, they had suffered heavily, and perhaps no country 
had suffered more than France. In addition to the dev-
astation of her territor~ she had lost 1,393,388 men, 
a figure which represented 3.5:per.cent of her total 
1 population,and 39 percent of .all Allied war deaths. 
The victory, aithough purcha~ed at great cost, 
did not mean security for.the French nation. What 
would happen when the German phoenix arose from the 
ashes? The French representatives at the peace con-
ference in 1919 were determined to gain French sec-
urity at whatever cost to Germany. Their demands in-
cluded German disarmament, the return of Alsace-
Lorraine and the complete separation from Germany of 
her provinces west of the Rhine. 2 
1James Thomas Emmerson, The Rhineland Crisis 7 
March 1936: A Stud in Multilateral Diplomac . (Ames: 
Iowa State University Press, 977 , p. 9 .. 
2Arnold Wolfers, Britain and France Between Two 
Wars (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1940), pp. 11-23. 
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Although they secured the first two demands, the 
third clashed with Woodrow Wilson's principles of na-
tional sovereignty and offended the British sense of 
pragmatism. A compromise among the powers resulted in 
the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland. It was agreed 
at Versailles that German military forces would never 
again be allowed west of a line drawn fifty kilometers 
(thirty miles) east of, and parallel to, the Rhine. 
(See Appendix A for a map of the zone) In addition, 
fortifications were permanently prohibited within the 
zone. Any violation of these articles, 42 and 43 of 
the Treaty of V_ersailles, would be regarded, said 
Article 44, as a "hostile act·. . calculated to 
.. 
disturb the peace of the worid." (The relevant clauses 
of the Treaty of Versailles are given in Appendix B) 
The treaty "did not, however, oblige any country to aid 
France in preventing German remilitarization of the 
Rhineland. 3 
Having failed to gain the Rhineland either as a 
protectorate or as a buffer state, France sought assur-
ance from her allies that they would come to her aid in 
the event of unprovoked German aggression. In addition, 
3Emmerson, Rhineland Crisis, p. 20. 
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she sought some sort of guarantee of the demilitarized 
zone. An Anglo-American security guarantee was signed 
on 28 June 1919, which promised aid to France, but fell 
short of guaranteeing the demilitarized zone. The 
agreement stipulated that British aid was contingent 
upon approval by the United States. The subsequent 
failure of the American Senate to ratify the Treaty 
of Versailles doomed the Anglo-American security guar-
antee and in effect, left -Fran~e.to her own devices. 
France regarded this as a betrayal by her allies. She 
then concluded a series of alliances with the lesser 
European nations who considered themselves threatened 
by the possibility, of a resurrected Germany. In Sep-
tember 1920, a military arrangement .was concluded be-
tween France and Belgium. In February 1921, a defen-
sive alliance was made.with Poland, and others were 
signed with Czechoslovakia. in January 1924; Hungary 
in June 1926, and with Yugoslavia and Rumania in Nov-
ember 1927. This alliance system, known as the "Lit-
tle Entente," was based on the idea of "collective 
security." The premise that the union of European 
states would act as a deterrent to German aggression, 
merely by the fact of its existence, characterized 
8 
French diplomatic efforts during the inter-~ar years. 
In 1933 France signed a non-aggression pact with Rus-
sia which would lead in 1936 to a treaty of mutual 
assistance.4 
This obsession with security intensified French 
determination to enforce strict adherence to the pro-
visions of the Treaty of Versailles, an attitude clear-
ly illustrated during the Ruhr crisis. French troops, 
assisted by a small contingent'. of Belgian Regulars, 
occupied ·the· Ruhr Valley, a major German industrial 
area, in January 1923, because Germany was behind in 
the delivery·of timber and coal. These deliveries 
were part of a _scheme of r_ej:Jarations payments which 
the German government -had declared itself incapable 
of making. France sought the assistance of Great 
Britain, but when this was ?ot forthcoming she deci-
ded to occupy the area, take over the mines and fac-
tories, and force the reparations payments. The French 
occupation of the 'Ruhr furthered in Germany the already 
simmering desire for revenge against Franc~. The epi-
sode increased the already rampant hostility toward 
the Treaty of Versailles, and in addition, created in 
Germany a feeling of isolation from the rest of Europe.5 
4rbid., pp. 20, 21. 
5
wolfers, Britain and France, p. 56. 
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By 1924, however, a general change in European 
attitudes had begun. Hostilities diminished, pros-
perity began to return, and the European nations be-
gan to move toward multilateral agreements that would 
guarantee peace in Western Europe. Whether this change 
came about because of general weariness of hostility or 
because of the easing of the reparations problem, the 
result was the Treaty of Locarno. The treaty was ne-
gotiated by Gustav Stresemann, Austen Chamberlain, 
Aristide Briand, ·and belatedly, Benito Mussolini. The 
Locarno pact included non-aggression agreements between 
Belgium, France and Germany. Italy and Great Britain 
both pledged to come to the aid of any country which 
was the victim of unprovoked aggression by another 
treaty partner. In addition, at Stresemann's sugges-
tion, the German government_voluntarily reaffirmed its 
obligations under Articles 42 and 43 of the Treaty of 
Versailles. Britain and Italy promised to guarantee 
the continued existence of the demilitarized zone, mil-
itarily if necessary. However, innnediate military ac-
tion was promised only if Germany massed troops inside 
the zone as an obvious forerunner to invasion.6 
6 . 
Ennnerson, Rhineland Crisis, pp. 22, 23 
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The Treaty of Locarno was in essence a pledge to 
respect Europe·an national fron.tiers. Each of the five 
nations involved, Great Britain, Italy, France, Bel-
gium, and Germany, was constrained from committing ag-
gression against another treaty signatory. Great Bri-
tain and Italy promised to come to the aid of any country 
which was the victim of unprovoked aggression from any of 
the five nations. Means for actual enforcement of treaty 
obligations were vagu~ .' .The .Council of the League of Na-
tions, on which Great.Britai~ had a permanent seat, was 
given the responsibility· of deciding.whether or not an 
obligation to intervene had.· arisen. ,Ther!= were, however, 
two exceptions. Great Britai~ and Italy, as guarantors, 
pledged themselves to immediate action in the case of a 
"flagrant" violation of any partner's territory, provi-
ded that the_guarantors themselves recognized the vio-
lation as flagrant. In addition, immediate action was 
warranted in the event of a flagrant breach by Germany 
of the Rhineland clauses of the Treaty of Versailles, 
provided that the guarantors had satisfied themselves 
7 that this aggression was unprovoked. (The relevant 
clauses and articles of the Treaty of Locarno are giv-
en in Appendix C) 
7
A. L. Kennedy, Britain Faces Germany (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1937), p. 46. 
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Although Great Britain agreed at Locarno to 
guarantee the western borders of Germany, she re-
fused to extend such a pledge to the eastern na-
tions of Czechoslovakia and Poland. The British 
government regarded Eastern Europe as outside the 
bounda~ies of her own national interests. These 
nations continued to depend upon France for their 
security and territorial integrity, since Germany 
would not renounce her claims to frontier changes 
. h 8 int e east. 
The Locarno Pact was vague and its machinery cum-
bersome. In fact, it was never intended to actually 
function. It·s very existence was s.een as adequate 
to preserve peace in'Western 'Europe. The "spirit of 
Locarno" was hailed as a great step toward peace, yet 
it did not erase- the distrust felt in France toward 
Germany. Locarno did not eliminate the French obses-
sion with security, and from 1925 on, the French na-
tion, relying increasingly on defensive fortifica-
tions became more and more introspective and French 
public opinion became increasingly pacific.
9 
8Aaron L. Goldman, "Crisis in the Rhineland: Bri-
tain, France and the Rhineland Crisis of 1936" (Ph.D. 
dissertation, Indiana University, 1967, University Mic-
rofilms, Ann Arbor, Michigan), p. 6. 
9 Emmerson, Rhineland Crisis, pp. 24, 25. 
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It was obvious to the French at this time that 
although guarantees had been made regarding European 
peace in general, those made with regard to the Rhine-
land were not very binding, and in fact no other Lo-
carno signatory, including Belgium, whose borders 
were contiguous with the Rhineland, considered the 
continuation of the demilitarized zone critical to 
peace in Eu:rope. 
To both the Sarraut and Blum governments, the 
Rhineland· was essential to French security and to the 
security of French allies. The Rhineland is the key 
German industrial .area and includes the cities of 
; 
Cologne, Coblenz, Krefeld, Aachen and Mainz, all in 
an area of about 9500 square miles. 10 As long as 
Germany was kept from remilitarizing and fortifying 
the area, the French Army was in an excellent posi-
tion for a quick blow against the industrial heartland . . 
of Germany. Prior to rearmament, it would have been 
easy for the French ·to send their armies into the 
Rhineland, as they had done during the Ruhr occupa-
tion of 1923. If this threat to Germany's industrial 
lONew York Times, March 18, 1936. 
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life did not succeed in keeping the Germans from fol-
lowing a policy of force in Eastern Europe, the re-
sulting war would at least be fought on German soil. 
German fortification of the Rhineland would consid-
erably impair France's effectiveness in aiding her 
allies in Central and Eastern Europe in the event of 
German aggression. Therefore, the remilitarization 
of the Rhineland was not only a threat to France's 
own security, it was_an even_gr~ater menace to the 
security of ;French ?llies in C_entral and Eastern 
Europe. To the French, remilitarization would mean 
the beginning of the end for'their postwar policy of 
balancing German power by a system of collective sec-
urity.11 
Conversely, the Rhineland was of great importance 
to Germany, and became even_n;iore so when Adolph Hitler 
rose to power. When Hitler became Chancellor of Ger-
many in January 1933, he brought with him an intense 
hatred for what he called the "chains of Versailles," 
and was determined to pursue a revisionist policy 
which would alter existing international agreements 
11charles A. Micaud, The French Right and Nazi 
Germany 1933-1939: A Study of Public Opinion (New 
York: Octagon Books, Inc,, 1964), pp. 77,78. 
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and accommodate Germany's new status in the world. Be-
cause of its industrial capacity, the Rhineland was in-
extricably linked with rearmament, and the rearmament 
of Germany was of primary importance to Hitler. As long 
as the zone remained vulnerable to French invasion, it 
was not possible for Germany to take full advantage of 
the Rhineland's capabilities and resources. With the 
removal of the threat of invasion, however, Hitler would 
be free to fully convert, the resources of the Rhineland 
to the rearmament industry. For Germany, therefore, re-
militarization of the Rhineland'was a necessary step to-. . 
ward a forced revision of the territorial clauses of the 
Treaty of Versailles, and the logical result of Hitler's .. 
1 d 
. 12 can estine rearmament program. 
Although.the "spirit of Locarno" prevailed in Europe 
for a decade, by 1935 it was diminishing and in 1936 it 
became extinct. German rearmament, the collapse of the 
World Disarmament Conference, Germany's withdrawal from 
the League of Nations, Mussolini's imperialist move 
against Ethiopia, and the subsequent realignment of the 
European powers all contributed to the death of Locarno 
and the crisis in the Rhineland. 
12Emmerson, Rhineland Crisis, p. 239. 
GP.APTER II 
GERMA_~Y PREPARES 
The Treaty of Versailles severelv limited the size 
of Germany's armed forces. It nermitted a small orofes-
sional army of 100,000 men to preserve order at home but 
forbade the manufacture of tanks, gas, military aircraft, 
' and submarines. Consequently: ·when Hitler came to nower, 
the Reichswehr'corisisted of only ten divisions, seven of 
infantry and three of cavalry'. These were su1Jplemented 
by the illegal Grenzschutzverbande, bands of volunteers 
numbering about Lf5·, 000. Despite· some secret rearmament 
dating from the 1920;s, Germany's military position in 
1932 was still weak. At that time, the troon office, 
the forerunner of° the Army General Staff, believed that 
effective resistance to an invading force would not be . . . 
possible before 194L,. Some orogress had been made to-
ward the creation of an air force, but even so, in 193), 
Germany nossessed only about eighty aircraft and 450 
flying personnel. The Navy had not even attained the 
levels permitted by the treaty and most of the existing 
f . 1 era t were nre-war vinta~e. 
1William Carr, Arms, Autarkv and Aggression (New 
York: W.W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1972), pp. 26, 27. 
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Although violations of the arms limitation clauses 
of the Treaty of Versailles had taken nlace under the 
Weimar Republic, they were of little consequence when 
com11ared with the militarv activitv which took nla.ce 
when Adoloh Hitler came to nower. When he became Chan-
cellor of the Third Reich, Hitler followed the orece-
dents set by the Weimar governments but gave too nri-.. . . 
ority to the task of rearmament, sensing the oonularitv 
of such a program. One of the first acts of his gov-
ernment was to create the Reich "Defense Council, an 
organization chargecl. with the co.ordination and direc-
tion of the secret rearmament of Germany. Under the 
Fiihrer's direction, the outlawed German nfficers Corns 
was resurrected ann the Generals were instructed to 
carry out a three-fold exnansi9n of the Army, and to 
form several armored units. 2 
In spite of the Rhineland nrovisions of the Ver-
sailles treaty and the vulnerabilitv they imnlied, 
there was substantial clandestine activity in the Ruhr 
and Rhineland armament works, es~ecially those of Krupn 
2John W. Wheeler-Bennett, The Nemesis of Power: 
The German Army in Politics 1918-1945 (New York: St. 
Martin's Press, Inc., 1954), o. 308. 
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and I. G. Farben. Krupp had been forbidden by the 
Allies to continue in the armament business after 
1919, but the company had nevertheless not been idle. 
I. G. Farben, under a similar ban, had by 1933 dis-
covered how to make synthetic rubber from coal. By 
the beginning of 1934, plans were approved by Hit-
ler's Reich Defense Council for the mobilization of 
these and some 240,000 other plants for war orders. 
By the end of that year, rearmament, in all its phases, 
had become so massive that it could no longer beef-
fectively concealed. 3 · Initially, it appears that Hit-
ler's caution was motivated by ~ear of a hostile French 
reaction, but as it'became obvious that this was not to 
I; 
be forthcoming, the pace of rearmament quickened. 
Increased rearmament along-with consolidation of 
his domestic po~vers led Hitler to consider leaving the 
League of Nations. The opportunity to do so presented 
itself in the fall of 1933 when the League's disarmament 
talks at Geneva stalled. Through his diplomats, Hitler 
3William L. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third 
Reich: A History of Nazi Germany (New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 1960), p. 282. 
4
Telford Taylor, ·Munich: 
York: Doubleday & Co., Inc. , 
The Price of Peace (New 
1979), p. 97. 
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asserted Germany's total willingness to disarm, but not 
in the face of overwhelming evidence that the other na-
tions of Europe were unwilling to do so. Hitler with-
drew from the League and caused the collapse of the dis-
armament Conference. Hitler's move had great popular 
support from his countrymen, who indicated their approv-
al in a plebiscite held on November 12. German with-
drawal from th_e League angered Great Britain and Italy, 
but the French government was less upset. It had lit-
tle confidence that the Germans·~ould in fact observe 
any disarmament agreement they might sign and was there-
fore not as disturbed as others by the rupture in the 
disarmament negotiations. 5 
Apparent British willingness to accept German re-
armament and treaty violations was responsible for en-
couraging Hitler to carry out .further transgressions. 
On 16 March 1935, in the first of his "Saturday Sur-
prises," Hitler reintroduced conscription and announced 
that the German Army would be increased to thirty six 
5Gerhard L. Weinberg, The Foreign Policy of Hit-
ler's·German : Di J.omatic Revolution in Euro e 1933-
36 Chicago and London: The University of Chicago 
Press, 1970), pp. 166, 167. 
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divisions. He outlined plans for an army made un of 
500,000 regulars, a move which was clearly in contraven-
tion to the Treaty of Versailles an<l the Locarno uact. 
As justification for his plans, the Fuhrer claimed that 
the German people had laid down arms in 1918 in full 
confidence that President Wilson's "Fourteen Points would 
stabilize and equalize the European nations as well as 
the world. He asserted that the German neonle had placed 
high hone in the League of Nations, convinced that "by 
fulfilling _the disarm_ament conditions of the Treaty of 
Versailles they would make possible a general interna- :_ 
tional disarmameI).t." _.The· victor states had, he said, 
unilaterally relea·sed themselves from their obligations, 
and armaments had increased everywhere. He charged 
that none of the victors were interested in fulfillment 
of the Versailles disarmament nrovisions and therefore 
the 
own 
German people had to assume resnonsibility for their 
defense. 6 For this Germany was reproached by the 
so-called "Stresa Powers," France, Italy and Britain, 
who met in April in Italy, but agreed on nothing besides 
condemnation of Hitler's announcement. 7 
6R. B. Mowat, Eurone in Crisis: Political Drama in 
Western Eurone (Bristol, England: J. W. Arrowsmith, LTD., 
1936), p. 36. 
7 Goldman, "Crisis in the Rhineland," n. 15. 
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The lack of concerted action by the Locarno nowers 
was in large measure due to Hitler's di11lomatic maneu-
verings, calculated offers of enticing agr~ements, and 
to his caution. Although much of Hitler's rearmament 
activity was confirmed by British and French intelli-
gence, Berlin could often exnlain it away in very plau-
sible terms. Early rearmament efforts were cautious, 
and insofar as possible, Hitier attem9ted to make them 
. .. l <lf . R appear innocuous, or at worst, ,mere· ~ e .. ensi ve. · Hhe-
ther this was simply rhetoric for masking his aggres-
sive designs or whether·it indicates legitimate concern 
for the defensive capabilities of .. his nation, Hitler con-
tinually offered disclaimers of responsibility. He sought 
to legitimize German rearmament in the eyes of the world 
by shifting the blame either to other Eurooean nations 
I 
in general or to France in particular. By blaming the 
French for their pact with the Soviet Union, Hitler nlayed 
the trump card offered him by the French right in their 
. . h 9 opposition tot at agreement. It has also been suggested 
that a major purpose in shifting the blame was for domes-
. d 10 tic propagan a purposes. 
8 
Emmerson, Rhineland Crisis, P. 29. 
9Micaud, French,,Right, pp. 85-105. 
10 
Weinberg, Foreign Policy, p. 241. 
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Nowhere was Hitler's caution and.strategy more evident 
than in the Rhineland. Hitler discouraged overt activity 
in the area, especially during the year preceding the couo. 
The Reichswehr wanted to make advance preparations in the 
zone, but Hitler permitted them to ma~e only those essen-
tial defensive preparations which could be concealed al-
together or disguised with a cloak of legitimacy. Into 
the former category fell such activities as stock-piling 
uniforms, rifles, gre~ades_ and heavy machine guns. Artil-
lery, tanks, and planes were st;rictly forbidden. Obstruc-
tion and resistance zones were set up and preparations 
made for establishing as well as destroying communications 
and transport networks. Rifle ranges were hidden in na-
ture preserves and materi~l which could not be concealed 
was cleverly disguised. Observa.tion and machine guns 
posts were erected as customs or fire watch towers, and 
/ 
the construction of subterranean depots for materie!l and 
munitions was disguised as mining activity. Civilians 
occupied barracks, thereby justifying maintenance. Gli-
der and air sport clubs abounded, as a front for the 
construction of air bases. In addition to the maintenance 
of a 31,500 man police force which the Versailles treatv 
authorized in the zone, approximately 14,000 para-military 
L d 1 . . b . . d . h ll an espo izei were eing traine int e area. 
11Ernrnerson, Rhineland Crisis, P. 28. 
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Significant progress was al.so being made in German 
naval development. Hitler's goal in this area was to 
develop the kind of navy that would orotect Germany's 
access to Swedish iron ore, safeguard communications 
with East Prussia, insure control of the Baltic against 
the Soviet Union, and give her the ability to threaten 
the oceanic sup-ply routes of France. While he was de-
termined to build up German naval strength, Hitler pre-
ferred not to offend the British., Diolomatic approaches 
were made towar,d Great Britain in early 1935, indicating 
Germany's willingness to negotiate an agreement limiting 
Germany's naval strength to 35 percent of· that of Great 
Britain. In June 1935, the British government, much to 
the chagrin of the French, signed the Anglo-German Naval 
Agreement which accomplished this. As far as naval con-
struction was concerned, the agreement had no particular 
significance. Germany could and did develop its navv as 
it wished, but Hitler had scored a major diplomatic tri-
umph at no cost to Germany, and had succeeded in driving 
a wedge between France and Great Britain. 12 
12weinberg, Foreign Policy, p. 211. 
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The Anglo-German Naval Agreement seriously undermined 
Franco-British solidarity, and in effect recognized 
Germany's right to rearm. Such an agreement imolied 
tacit acceptance of German rearmament and indicated 
British willingness to overlook the fact that such re-
armament was forbidden by the Versailles treaty, 
The Anglo-German Naval Agreement destroyed the so-
called "Stresa-Front" and illustrated the differences 
in diplomatic attitude between the British and French 
Foreign Ministries. Both British and French intelligence 
were aware of Hitler's rearmament of Germany. France had 
more than once considered filing a complaint with the 
League which would have enabled the Locarno powers to 
oblige Germany to return co the status quo. While France 
was inclined not to negotiate the issue, Great Britain 
believed that since Germany was going to rearm anyway, 
it was in the British interest to secure in bilateral 
agreements whatever limitations she could. Even at this 
early date, Hitler's record of keeping his oromises was 
not spotless, and although British diolomats recognized 
the fact that agreements with him were not infallible, 
they were considered better than none at all. 13 
13 rbid., pp. 210-214; and Shirer, Rise and Fall, 
pp. 281-283. 
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Throughout 1935 rearmament continued, but Hitler 
and his generals agreed that the Locarno treaty afforded 
them valuable protection against a French offensive in 
the Rhineland and therefore did not want to endanger 
that protection by overtly bellicose activity. Germany 
during this time used the Locarno agreement as a shield 
behind which to rearm, and then discarded it when it was 
14 
believed no longer useful. 
During the winter of 1935-36, the French and Bri-
tish both apparently harbored a considerably exaggerated 
view of German military strength, but the evidence indi-
cates that this was the impression Hitler wished to con-
vey. Certain records suggest that the Germans deliberately 
ordered their few fighter squadrons to fly from one aero-
drome to another, ~hanging their insignia from time to 
time to give the impression that Hitler had a vast con-
centration of fighter 'aircraft equal to anything the Bri-
tish or French could put in the air. 15 This activity 
considerably enhanced the already prevalent view that Ger-
man rearmament had reached dangerous proportions. At the 
14Mowat, Europe in Crisis, P. 78. 
15F. W. Winterbotham, CBE, The Nazi Connection (New 
York: Harper & Row, 1978), p. 13 . 
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same time, there is also evidence to suggest that the 
German Chancellor was attempting to conceal the re-
armament of Germany and to proceed with great secrecy 
in the Rhineland. In spite of this apparent contra-
diction in intent, Hitler apparently succeeded simu-
ltaneously in both endeavors. His success can per-
haps be attributed to the already prevalent diplo-
matic practice in both France and Great Britain of 
pretending not to notice what '"they did not want to 
see. 
As the year 1936. approached Hitler became in-
creasingly convinced that his r,evisionist plans could 
be carried out in the near futur'e. He was determined 
to cut away the-remaining "chains of Versailles" and 
to gain for Germany a position of equality in inter-
national affairs. Hitler was riding the crest of 
popularity because of the successes of his domestic 
policies. A new Germany was being built. Hitler had 
generated a feeling of excitement among his people 
and convinced them that Germany was destined for great-
ness.16 
16 
Goldman, "Crisis in the Rhineland," pp. 20, 21. 
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There was no doubt in Hitler's mind that the Rhine-
land demilitarized zone would have to be reoccupied by 
German troops. The only question was whether it would 
be accomplished when the international situation drew 
attention away from such a move or when the armed forces 
17 had reached sufficient strength. 
The German dictator, now solidly entrenched in pow-
er, believed in the interdependence of internal and ex-,, 
ternal policy. In his Zweites Buch, Hitler wrote: 
Domestic policy must secure the inner strength 
of the people so that· it• can assert itself in 
the sphere of foreign policy. Hence domestic 
policy and foreign policy are not only most 
closely linked but must -also mutually comple-
ment each ot,her .18 . · 
Hitler's early successes ··in foreign policy had 
made him bold. He had used the excuse of French bel-
licosity to reintroduce cons_cription in Germany, in 
unequivocal contravention to· the Treaty of Versailles. 
He had withdrawn from the World Disarmament Conference 
in October 1933, once again blaming France, but this time 
using delaying tactics and promises of peace to soften the blow 
17Ibid., p. 21. 
18carr, Arms·, Autarky, p. 32, quoting Adolph Hitler, 
Hitler's Secret Book, p. 34. 
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and insure against reprisals. Striking confirmation 
of Hitler's ascendancy in the field of foreign affairs 
had come in January 1934, when Germany signed a non-
aggression pact with Poland. This pact was a logical 
extension of Hitler's anti-Marxist feelings and indi-
cated his fear of "encirclement." In 1932, France had 
persuaded Poland to sign a nonaggression -pact with Rus-
, . 
sia so that the Poles wo~ld not be intimidated by the 
growing power of that state.' 'Hitler apparently be-
lieved that in the absence of a German agreement with 
Poland, that country might be'tempted by France into 
military action against Germany. Ironically, the pact 
with Poland had the ultimate effect of actually s-peed-
ing up the encirclement wh1ch Hitler feared by hasten-
ing Russia's rapprochement w_ith the West. In February 
1934, Russia, alarmed by the agreement between Poland 
and Germany, ratified her nonaggression pact with France 
and in September of that year became a member of the 
League of Nations. 19 
19 Ibid., pp. 33-35. 
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Having calmed the Polish fear of German aggres-
sion and diplomatically pacified his eastern borders, 
Hitler again turned his attentions westward. While 
secretly rearming Germany and laying careful plans to 
increase Germany's living space, Hitler endeavored to 
assure the rest of Europe that he had no intentions 
of disturbing the peace. In an attempt to allay the 
fears of his western neighbors, Hitler sent German 
. . . 
emissaries to the various EuroRean embassies. Their 
responsibility was to make it plain to those who were 
concerned with rumors of a possible German move that 
Germany had no intention of occupying the Rhineland 
or in any other way breaching the peace. In addition, 
they were instructed to stress that the Germans felt 
isolated by a hostile Europe, and fearful for their 
own security. They were further instructed to ascer-
tain the likelihood of a military response from any 
quarter in the event of a German move in the demili-
20 tarized zone. 
In the midst of these diplomatic maneuverings an 
event occurred which would further Hitler's cause. In 
20Goldman, "Crisis in the Rhineland," p. 22. 
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October 1935, Benito Mussolini went to war with Ethio-
pia. This was precisely the international scene stealer 
the Fuhrer needed to divert world attention from the 
Rhineland. On October 4, the day after the Italian in-
vasion began, William Shirer wrote in his Berlin Diary: 
The Wilhelmstrasse is delighted. Either Mussolini 
will stumble and get himself so heavily involved 
in Africa that he will be greatly weakened in Europe, 
whereuPon Hitler can sieze Austria, hitherto Pro-
tected by the Duce; or he wi;J_l win, defying France 
and Britain, and thereunon be ripe for· a tie-un 
with Hitler agai~!t the.Western democracies. Either 
way Hitler wins. · , 
Events proved this to be an accurate appraisal of the 
situation. A torrent of international criticism descended 
upon Mussolini. The League of Nations condemned Italy as 
an aggressor and voted a partial embargo of strategic 
items against her. 2J Britain favored sanctions against 
Italy, but desired no involvement severe enough to Pre-
cipitate armed conflict. British public opinion indi-
cated overwhelming willingness to support the League 
against Italy, in any move short of war. France was 
amazed at the British stance. The nations that had been 
uRwilling to accept responsibility for the integrity of 
the Eastern European allies of France suddenly seemed 
21shirer, Rise and Fall, p. 288, quoting his Berlin 
Diary, p. 43. 
22Goldman, "Crisis in the Rhineland," p. 32. 
30 
eager to support Ethiopia, a country whose security 
redounded not at all on European interests. Coming 
right after •the British abandonment of the "Stresa 
Front" in the naval treaty with Germany, the anti-
Italian thrust of British policy was especially re-
gretted by the French government, which had recently 
signed a secret agreement with Italy to resist Ger-
man aggression in Europe, particularly Austria. 23 
'· . 
i-, ., ~ . I, ' ~ ' ,· : 
The disas_trous _Hoar~-Laval Plan, which was se-
1 ., .• • .. \ 
cretly made by'. the British a~d- French Foreign Min-
isters, cost both ministers' th'eir jobs when details . -, . . . . 
of the plan were made public._ . The agreement would . . 
' ., 
have ended the conflict with ... Ethiopia, but would 
have rewarded Italy's aggressive efforts with two-
thirds of Ethiopia Is territory·' British public 
opinion blamed France .for the· fiasco. This epi-
sode significantly cooled the zeal for any sort of 
combined action with France. 24 
23weinberg, Foreign Policy, pp. 196, 197, 217, 
218. 
24 
John W. Wheeler-Bennett, Munich: Prologue 
to Tragedy (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 
1948), pp. 251, 252. 
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The British were unwilling to push forward against 
Italy alone. Their disenchantment with France for her 
failure to support full sanctions against Italy nega-
tively influenced British policy on the question of sup-
porting France against Germany during the Rhineland cri-
sis. The significance of these developments was not 
lost on Adolph Hitler. The Ethiopian invasion had served 
his purposes by drawing international attention way from 
; 
Europe. It also widened the. ·breach between Britain and 
France and paved the way for the Rome-Berlin axis. 
Hitler's international positio~ had been strength-
ened by rearma~eht and his opponents weakened by quar-
rels among themselves. By the summer of 1935, Hitler 
believed that the time was coming when his troops could 
occupy the Rhineland. Simply to march in would not do, 
however, since he was still·operating under the premise 
that Germany considered herself bound by agreements 
signed voluntarily but not by those imposed on her. It 
was therefore necessary to prepare a legal case against 
the continued validity of the Locarno agreement. The 
Franco-Soviet Pact provided a convenient excuse. 25 
25weinberg, Foreign Policy, pp. 240, 241. 
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France and the Soviet Union, both of whom felt 
threatened by the growing power and antagonism of 
Hitler towards them, had agreed in May 1935 to form 
a defensive alliance against possible German aggres-
sion. The pact had to be ratified by the legisla-
tures of both countries, and since this was an infi-
nitely more difficult task in France than in Russia, 
it was not accomplished_ there until March 1936. When 
Hitler learned of the pact., he sent memoranda to 
both France and Great Britain, asserting his belief 
that the proposed alliance conflicted with France's 
obligations under the Locarn_o treaty and was there-
fore illegal. The claim that a·Franco-Soviet trea-
ty contradicted Locarno would give Germany a perfect 
pretext for violating it herself. 26 It is ironic 
that the Franco-Soviet Pact provided both the 
justification and the occasion for doing just that. 




By early 1936 Adolph Hitler was convinced that the 
time was right for a move in the Rhineland. The Fuhrer 
had begun definite plans for a coup in June 1935, but 
his target date was mid-1937: This is revealed in the 
minutes of the Working Committee of the Reich Defense 
Council, which were used as evidence at the Nuremberg 
War Crimes Trial in 1946. Alfred Jodl told the Working 
Committee that the-preparations for mobilization in the 
,' ' ' 
demilitarized zone were .to be kept absolutely secret and 
that written records were prohib_ited. If paoerwork was 
essential, it was to· be kept in safes, and all weapons, 
uniforms and other equtpment must be stored out of sight. 
Administrative personnel were instructed to be cautious 
and to recognize the principle that "concealment is mor·e 
1 important than results." 
1Goldman, "Crisis in the Rhineland," p. 17, citing 
Minutes of the Tenth Meeting of the Workini Committee.of 
the Reich Defense Council, June 26, 1935, in Nazi Con-
spiracy and Aggression, Volume VII (Washington, D.C., 
1946-1948), p. 454. 
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Only a few of Hitler·• s most trusted officials were aware 
of his plan, although it was common knowledge in mili-
tary circles that the rearmament of the Rhineland was an 
important goal of the Third Reich. 
It was in February 1936 when Hitler apparently first 
told anyone outside his most intimate circle that he was 
considering a move in the Rhine1and. This decision to 
reoccupy and-rearm the demili.tarized zone in no way rep-
resented the consensus of opinion-between Adolph Hitler 
and his military leaders, Th~re was also dissent from 
some government officials and.members·of the diplomatic 
. ; ; ' . 
i , :;.• : • 
corps. According. tloi General '"Fritz von Manstein, the Ger-
' ' 
'\_ .. · . . 
man generals diq nq.t demand,thEr mili 1::ary occupation and 
certainly did pot intend it as~ preparation for war. 
, 
General Werner von Fritsch,, ·a technical expert who had 
'{ . 
commanded the German Ar,my since 1934, told Hitler that 
the armed forces were not yet.strong enough to take 
such a risk, and warned that the affair might lead to a 
major conflict. He advtsed Hitler that if the French 
retaliated with force, they would have little difficulty 
in driving the Germans back, and it would be they who 
would occupy the Rhineland and not the Germans. 2 
2Goldman, "Crisis in the Rhineland," p. 114, citing 
Trial of the Major War Criminals, International Militarv 
Tribunal (Nuremberg, 1948), Volume XV, P. 351. 
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The German Ch_ancellor received support for his 
plan from Hermann Goering and Joseph Goebbels, but his 
uncertainty prior to the couo led him to call General 
Fritsch back to hear his views again. The General re-
peated his previous arguments, and offered to resign, 
saying that he would not bear the responsibility for 
the impending disaster. Hitler assured Fritsch that the 
whole responsibility would be his own, and that if the . . ' . . . 
German forces m~t any resist8:nc_e·, they were to retreat. 3 
At the }Juremberg trials, General- Manstein exoressed 
the view that the apprehension showp by the Generals .. · 
first aroused the· disbrust and:lcontempt which Hitler 
felt toward his miii tary·'1ead~rs,. 4 
Hitter's distrust and dissiitisfaction extended to 
the career diplomats who shared_ the apprehension of the 
military and cautioned the Fuhrer against action in the 
Rhineland. One diplomat, however, assured Hitler that 
he had nothing to fear. The former wine merchant and 
opportunist extraordinaire, Joachim van Ribbentrop, ra.n 
an independent extension of the German Department of 
3rbid., p. 115. 
4rbid., Citing Trial, Vol~me XX, P. 603. 
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State known as the Buro Ribbentrop. In an office across 
from diplomatic headquarters on Wilhelmstrasse, the flam-
boyant Ribbentrop conducted the Reich's foreign affairs 
when ordinary channels did not suffice. He was responsi-
ble only to the Fuhrer, and as Hicler became more and more 
disenchanted with the slow-moving and tradition-bound 
diplomats, Ribbentrop's influence grew. He ingratiated 
himself with Hitler and was named Special Envoy to Great 
' . 
Britain. Ribben~rop was fluent in English and could there-
fore engage in direct and private conversation. He con-
vinced Hitler that public opinion in Britain was favor-
able to Germany and that many Englishmen would adopt the 
same, attitude regarding the Rhineland if they stood in 
Hitler's shoes. He also told Hitler that Great Britain 
5 was too weak to risk any military engagement. 
Although warned by most of his top advisors not to 
undertake action in the demilitarized zone, Hitler chose 
his own course. In mid-January, Pierre Laval announced 
that the long-delayed ratification debate over the 
5
rbid., p. 24. The career of Ribbentrop is discussed 
in Gordon A. Craig and Felix Gilbert, eds., The Diplomats 
1919-1939 (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1953), 
~26. 
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Franco-Soviet Pact would finally occur. This announce-
ment probably caused Hitler to seriously consider advan-
. h" 1937 d b · h' 6 c1ng 1s target ate y resurrecting 1s excuse. 
The legal experts at the German Foreign Ministry 
may have legitimately believed that the Franco-Soviet 
Pact was incompatible with Locarno. Whether or not Hit-
ler shared this view is immaterial. For him it was an 
ideal pretext and he was not prepared to lose it by warn-
ing the French of the consequences of ratification. He 
appears to have been ~ore than:willing to trade passage 
of the treaty for a r~militarized Rhineland. Since the 
previous spring, Hifler had excoriated the Franco-Soviet 
' . . 
agreement as_ .a __ threat to the German people. Having been 
exposed to anti-Bolshevik arguments for more than three 
years, they could reasonably be expected to regard Hit-
--
ler' s coup as a Justifiable and prudent resoonse to rat-
ification. Hitler believed that the anti-Communist argu~ 
ments would also strike a sympathetic chord throughout 
significant segments of British and French public opinion, 
as well as in other European countries and in America. 7 
6weinberg, Foreign Policy, p. 247. 
7Emmerson, Rhineland Crisis, pi:,. 76, 77. 
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There were, in addition to this, several inter-
nFl and external factors which favored an early move. 
Domestically, the arguments for action were economic, 
strategic and political. The economic situation in 
Germany as a whole as not critical but there were the 
beginnings of a serious tightening of the economy as 
the German rearmament boom approached a state of full 
employment. There were fiscal problems involving in-
ternational currency as.well as domestic monetary dif-
ficulties. 
The situation was serious enough to warrant a new 
propaganda campaign to rally German public opinion be-
hind the government·, s policies. The old slogan of the 
National Socialist Party had been "Freedom and Bread," 
but on 17 January 1936, Joseph Goebbels launched a 
new slogan, "Guns or Butter.". Some observers sub-
sequently argued that ·one of-the reasons for the tim-
ing of the Rhineland action was to divert the atten-
tion of the German public from the economic difficul-
8 ties of the winter of 1935-1936 by a spectacular coup. 
8 , 
Weinberg, Foreign Policy, pp. 245, 246. 
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Inside the demilitarized zone, economic conditions 
had deteriorated to the point where press criticism of 
the German government was becoming heated and demands 
were being made for immediate relief. Unemployment, 
housing shortages, and rising costs had encouraged both 
Communists and the always troublesome Rhenish separatists 
to call for action. Hitler had sent Goering and other 
officials to deal with.the PFOblem, but with no success. 
Because of the unrest, German industrialists viewed the 
zone as vulnerab1e and either refused to build new plants 
there or transferred existing ~perations to other areas 
of the country.~ Because of the zone's industrial cap-
acity and potential armament production capabilities, 
the Chancellor of the Third Reich could not allow the 
situation to worsen. 
Strategically the situa,tion had deteriorated with 
the Fre~ch gov~rnment's decision to submit the Franco-
Soviet Pact for ratification. German military leaders, 
already chafing over the difficulties posed by the de-
militarized zone to their rearmament and army reorganiza-
tion effort~, now became concerned over the possibility 
9Emmerson, Rhineland Crisis, p. 72. 
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of a clash provoked by the Soviet Union which would 
oblige the French to attack the Reich. Furthermore, 
according to Constantin von Neurath's testimony at 
Nuremberg, German military intelligence learned in the 
winter of 1935 of the existence of French plans to at-
tack and divide Germany by driving along the Main River 
and linking up with Czech and Soviet forces advancing 
from the east. Also important were the defensive gains 
made by the Reich during the re··cent months of intensive 
rearmament efforts. Although th_e German military caoa-
bility was much less remarkable than many foreign ex-
perts believed, the common international over-estimates 
of Germany's land and air power worked significantly to 
the Reich's advantage. In addition, Germany's relative 
military position, which had improved so dramatically, 
was likely to be-less favorable in 1937, since her po-
tential foes had begun to correct their military defi-
. . 10 c1.enc1.es. 
10 
Emmerson, Rhineland Crisis, pp. 73, 74. This para-
graph closely follows Emmerson's assessment of Germany's 
strategic advantages. His sources include Documents on 
German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945, Series C, Volume IV, and 
Trial of the Major War Criminals, Volume XVI, pp. 677, 678, 
and Volume X, p. 94. His conclusions are similar to those 
drawn by E. M. Robertson, Hitler's Pre-War Policy and Mili-
tary Plans 1933-1939 (New York: The Citadel Press, 1967). 
Emmerson cites Robertson frequently in this section. 
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Hitler also had personal and political re/lsons· for 
choosing to act when he did. His nenchant for sururises 
coupled with a desire to further consolidate his position 
motivllted the Fuhrer to restore military sovereignty in 
the Rhineland. It had been almost a year since he star-
tled the world by reinstituting conscription. He now saw 
further means of regenerating enthusiasm for himself and 
the National Socialist Par-ty by ·c3;sting off the last of 
the "chains of Versailles." '.lihe,demilitarized zone stood 
as the sole remain~ng_mµjor domestic symbol of Germany's 
second-class status. There were few Germans who would 
not hail its disappearance, ·nor were they likely to re-
gret the repudic1t ion of Locarn~ _· ll 
These domestic and political considerations combined 
with the favorable iuxtapos:\,tiqri of external events and 
the apparent disunity of Germany's major opuonents to . 
seal the fate of the Rhineland demilitarized zone. The 
Abyssinian conflict paved the way. As a result of Italy's 
invasion of Ethiopia and Mussolini's subsequent political 
isolation, the "Stresa Front" had been totally destroyed 
and it now seemed possible that Italy might not be dis-
11 
Ibid., pp. 74, 75; and Shirer, Rise and Fall, 
pp. 231, 290-293. 
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posed to fulfill her obligations as a Ruarantor against 
German aggression in the demilitarized zone. This was 
all thE: more likely in view of the fact that Germany, bv 
not joining in economic sanctions against Italy, had be-
come that country's most important trading partner. This 
benevolence toward the Duce was not something Hitler in-
tended to go unrewarded. Mussolini's adventure in Afri-
ca also benefitted Hitler by disrupting Anglo-French re-
. ' . ' : . 
lat ions. The ill feeling genera_ted by the Hoare-Laval 
' 
affair, the belief.in Great Britain that the French were 
dragging their feet ·in defense oI· the Italian aggressors, 
' ' 
and the convictioq in Frande.that the British were des-
troying the front aga.inst· ~ermany by is9lating Mussolini 
and driving him into the arms of'-'the Fuhrer all worked 
to Germany's advantage. 
The Abyssinian crisis also proved helpful to Germanv 
in other ways. As Hit\er observed, sanctions against Italy 
were not a burden eagerly borne by the nations of Europe, 
and their imposition had reduced both the ability and 
the willinl!,ness of the lesser powers to undertake a sec-
ond such obligation. Hitler believed he had nothing to 
fear as far as economic sanctions were concerned. As 
has already been mentioned, the Ethionian invasion diverted 
international attention from Germanv, but at the same time 
it provided a contrast for Hitler's move. People were dving 
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in Africa; Hitler was planning a bloodless coup. More-
over, the Afric,m venture enabled German leadeFs and 
diplomats to argue that it was absurd for France to sup-
port only economic sanctions against a blatant aggressor 
and then demand heavier penalties for an internal action 
·h d h , · 12 tat pose not reat to anyones security. 
In spite of the opportunities offered by the Abyssin-
ian conflict and the existence of a handy pretext, Hitler 
would pro.bably ndt have risked his coun in March 1936 had 
it not been for the wea~ness and disunity of the opposi-
. 13 tion. 
Hitler_ watched and evaluated every move the British 
and French made, searching for the points over which the 
two powers could be separated. German intelligence re-
ported in January that the new French Foreign Minister, 
Pierre~_Etienne FlanditJ., sounded out the British government 
12Andre Francois Poncet, The Fateful Years: Memoirs 
of a French Ambassador in Berlin,1931-19~Fr-ance,-F1arii-
marion, 1946; reprinted., New Yor!Z: Howard Fertig, 1972), 
pp. 235-238. 
13Emmerson, Weinberg and Shirer all make this obser-
vation and it is implicit in the writings of several other 
authors as well. For examples, see Emmerson, Rhineland 
Crisis, pp. 76-77; Weinberg, Foreign Policy, p. 243; and 
Shirer, Rise and Fall, p. 281. 
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reg'ardinp: the nosition it would take in the event of a 
reoccupation of the Rhineland, He 




it would be 
Some of the intelligence which came to the German 
foreign office indicated French determination was strong. 
One report indicated that Flandin told Anthony Eden that 
in the event of a flagrant breach of Locarno, France 
would mobilize her .forces. 15 Nevertheless, Hitler dicl 
not believe the French would respond militarily to a coun, 
as long as it could not be oerceived as a nrenaration for 
an attack on Frarice. His confidence stemmed from his 
knowledge of French domestic weakness and from the con-
viction that "the French would not JT1arch without Britain, 
whose desire for a militarv solution was deemed non-
. 16 existent. 
llf 
Anthony Eden, Facing the Dictators, The Memoirs 
of Anthony Eden Earl of Avon (Boston: Ho.iighton Mi ftlin 
Co., 1962), p. 373. 
15Goldman, "Crisis in the Rhineland," n. 27, quoting 
Telegram from Charge d'~faires in France to Foreign Minis-
try, February 7, 1936, in Documents on c;erman Foreign Pol-
icy, 1918-1945, Series C, Volume IV (Washington, D.C., 
P152), n. 1112. 
l6Emmerson, Rhineland Crisis, p. 77. 
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Hitler's conviction that the French would not make 
a military reloinder was reinforced bv the German Charg~ 
d'affaires, Dirk Forster, who had observed tbe operations 
of the French government from his dinlomatic post in Par-
is. He reminded Hitler that the French had reacted voci-
ferous l'y 1-1hen the Fuhrer reinstituted conscription the 
orevious year, but French troops had not marched. Now, 
s6me'eleven months· later, the Reich was considerablv 
s'tronger, while in.ternal developments in France had caused 
a general deterioration in her abilitv and willingness 
to take ac.tion .. The current ministry of Albert Sarraut 
was strictly a caretaker ~overnment whose goal was to 
maintain the status quo. ~he alliance of the French 
Communists with the Socialists and Radical Socialists 
which formed the government titled the Ponnlar front, 
led to a series of ugly leftist-rightist confrontations 
throughout the· country. In mid-February, Forster was 
summoned from Paris for a meeting with the F\ihrer. Al-
thou.e:h Forster refused to guarantee French inaction, he 
expressed doubt that the Sarraut f'Overnment could sustain 
resistance in the face of a coup in the Rhineland. Equal-
ly useful during the pre-coun period were the assurances 
46 
made to Hitler that the French people were so deeply 
pacific, possibly even defeatist, that they would 
fight only if France were invaded. A "very influential" 
member of the French government had said as much to the 
German Ambassador, Roland Koster, in December. Premier 
Pierre Laval had later confirmed to Koster that French 
public opinion would not support military action be-
17 yond the frontiers of France. 
Hitler's belief in France's infirmity was heightened 
by t_he debate in. the Chamber of Deputies over ratifica-
tion of the treaty with Russ_ia. The proceedings, which 
began on February 11 and ran through February 27, brought 
fresh confirmation of the political and ideological con-
flicts with which France was plagued. French editor 
Charles Maurras reflected the sentiment of many right-
ists when he predicted that upon ratification, France 
would find herself in a dilemma between acceptance of a 
fait accompli in the Rhineland and the risk of defeat in 
17Micaud, French Right, pp. 69-8Lf, 87-101, 119. 
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attempting to prevent it. It became obvious to Germany 
during the debates that manv amonR the French right be-
lieved that ratification of a treaty with the Soviets 
would provide justification for a retaliatory occunation 
oF the Rhineland by Germany. 18 The rhetoric from the 
rightists was strong enough to provoke a renroach from 
Flandin on February 25 for "the dangerons thoughtlessness 
of their words." 19 
In spite of the Franco-Soviet alliance, Hitler 
di.scounted the possibility of Russian aid to France in 
the event of a German couo in the zone. Even though he 
continued to warn his cou~trv~en of the Soviet menace, 
he was convinced that Russi'a was too nreoccunied with . . 
internal problems to desire any Eurooean catastrophe, 
narticularlv since "the Japanese aooeared to be awaiting 
an opnortunity to attack the Soviet Union. No other 
European power: including England, was apparently con-
sidered by Hitler or his advisors as a potential source 
of military supoort for France if she chose to react 
forcefully to the remilitarization of the Rhinelanct. 20 
18 . 
Ibid., np. 6Q-84. 
19Paul Revnaucl, In the Thick of the l<'ight 1910-1945 
(France, 1951;. renrint ed., New York: Simon & Schuster, 
1955), D. 123. 
20 Emmerson, Rhineland Crisis, n. 80 
Adolph Hitler believed, and most nf his diolomatic 
advisors agreed, that the British would notohly fail ·co sup-
oort France in the event of a German reoccuoation of the 
Rhineland, they would actively seek to prevent her from 
taking any action. This confidence was based on know-
ledge of British military weakness, British desire for 
an air pact with Germany, the preoccupation of the Bald-
win government with do_mestic and Abyssinian affairs, and 
the presen·ce in Britain of a great deal of svmpathy for 
Germa·ny and resPect for the achievel'lents of the Chancel-
lor. Ribbentrop submitter\ a report to !-!itler in which he 
detailed his. coq.vers_ation 1~ith British government offi-
cials durinp; a recent week long mission. Neurath, too, 
had visited England and sharer\ Ribbentroo's imoression 
that Britain desired only cordial relations with the 
R 
.· h 21 
eic . 
Bv mid-Februaiy·it apneared that Hitler was deter-
mined to reoccupy the Rhineland in the coming weeks and 
that he would change his mind only if Presented with con-
vincing evidence that a coun would nrovoke a military 
response from any quarter. None of his diplomatic or 
military counselors could produce this sort of nroof. 
21 rbid., pp. 82, 83. 
On 2 March 1936, the military directives for the 
reoccupation of the Rhineland were issued by General 
von Blomberg. On 5 March. Hitler set the date. He 
chose the coming Saturday, 7 March, in the hope of 
gaining a weekend's respite before any counter moves 
could be made. On the day of the reoccuoation,the 
Locarno powers were to be in.formed. The Reichstag 
would convene ,on·. that day to hear a special rnessai;e 
from the Fi.ihrer: 22 
The code word· for the, reoccunation of the Rhine-
land was ."Winterubung." The orders nrovided for Ger-
man troons to move into ·.the Rhineland, i oining the 
local Landespolizei, already in position. They were 
to "remain after their arrival in their new stations 
in such a state of readiness that they can withdraw 
within an hour." Withdrawal did not mean a return to 
the status quo, however. The orders sryecified a 
.fighting retreat only as far as the Rhine if a mili-
tary rejoinder was made by the West. 23 The orders 
22weinberg, Foreign Policy, po, 251, 252. 
23 
Donald Cameron Watt, "German Plans for the Reoc-
cupation of the Rhineland: A Note," Journal of Con-
temporary History I, No. l, (October 19D6) : ryp. 193-
199. 
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indicute that Hitler was prenared to go to war to keen 
the zone, once it had been occupied. It is imoortant 
to note, however, that the orders were issued under the 
assumption that military onnosition would not be forth-
coming. 
On 7 March, as planned, German Croons marched into 
the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland. Hitler hacl. 
carefully surveyed the international situation, made his 
plans and carried them out. His timing was exact. His 
move was unopposed. 
CHAPTER IV 
FAIT ACCOMPLI 
Most of the soldiers involved in Winterubun(! knew 
nothing of their missions until they reached the edge of 
the demilitarized zone on the morning of 7 March. Hitler 
had maintained the secrecy of his plans by involving a min-
imum of persons in planning the operations. It appears 
that he confided in.only nine peoole during the weeks ore-
ceding the coup._ ·Those who were consulted or charged with 
preparing for ·the action were either trusted colleafues or 
diplomats who had beeri threatened if they did not keel) si-
lent. Most of the diplomats were informed less than twelve 
hours before the move .began and military prenarations were 
delayed as long as possible. The same sort of secrecv was 
maintained w.ith the German press. Members of Hitler's cab-
inet were informed on the night of 6 March, when he pre-
sented his decision to remilitarize the Rhinelanrl as a 
fait accompli and urged the government ministers to keep 
their nerve in the face of foreign reactions. 1 
1Emmerson, Rhineland Crisis, pp. 101-102, citing the 
private papers of Friedrich Hossbach, "7.wischen Wehrmacht 
.and Hitler, 1934-1938," (Gcittingen, 1965), pp. 97,98; 
Trial, Volume XI, p. 39; and various other documents, pri-




Dy the time the Saturday morning mist had risen, 
Germon troops had entered the demilitarized zone. The 
Fuhrer called a special session of the Reiehstag to 
announee his plan and the speech he oresented that morn-
ing was broadcast all over Europe. While Adoloh Hitler 
thundered before a stunned audience, infantry, artillery, 
motorized cavalry, tanks, machine gun units, anti-aircraft 
artillery and other.paraphernalia of modern warfare were 
crossing the Rhine bridges. As Hitler declared the death 
of the. Locarno pact, German troops goose-stepoed into the 
Rhine land·. 
2 
The troop movement total led between twenty 
five an·d thirty five .thousand men. 3 
In~ ~peech ·that lasted niriety minutes, Hitler 
attacked the Treaty of Versailles, blamin~ it for the 
ills of Eurooean society in general and Germany in parti-
cular: 
In the year 191-9, when the Peace Treaty had been 
signed, I took upon myself the duty of solving 
(the German) question. Not because I wanted to 
iniure France or anv other state but because the 
German peoole cannot permanently bear the wrong 
which has been done to them. They shall not bear 
it and they will not bear it. 
2New York Times, March 8, 1936. 
3Goldrnan, "Crisis in the Rhineland," o. 121. 
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Hitler declared that the peace treaty had forced 
Germany into a position of inequality among nations, a 
situation which had eroded the confidence and stability 
of both the German people and their government. He then 
cited his own efforts to restore these qualities. Once 
he had achieved this, the newly recovered German sense 
of honor demanded the destruction of the state of inequality. 
In view of th~ fact that the idea.of inequality 
had become so:roo.ted "in the minds of our neigh-
bors·, it ·was naturally difficult to show that the 
restoration of. German equality was not only un-
harmful to them, but that on the contrary it was, 
in the last analysis, ,an international benefit. 
You, my fellow members of the Reichstag know how 
hard was the road that I have had to travel since 
30 January·l933 in order to free the German people 
from the dishonourable position in which it found 
itself and to secure equality of rights steo hy 
step-without thereby alienating Germany from the 
oolitical and economic commonwealth of European 
nations, and particularly without creating new 
ill-feeling from the aftermath of old enmities. 
There .will come a time when I may appeal to his-
tory for confirmation of the fact that at no 
moment of my struggle on behalf of the German 
people,have I ever forgotten the duty incumbent 
on me and on us all to uphold European culture 
and European civilization . 
In these three years I have again and again endea-
vored-unfortunately too often in vain-to throw a 
bridge of understanding across to the oeople of 
France. The German people have no interest 
in seeing the French peoole suffer. And on the 
other hand what advantage can come to France when 
Germany is in misery? 
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Hitler went on to excoriate Bolshevism and to 
chastise the French for entering into an alliance with 
"those who preach world revolution." He then praised 
his own efforts to rid Germany of the Bolsheviks. He 
criticized the French "pactomania" and insisted that 
Germany was not a threat to any of her neighbors, and 
declared that he continually sought peaceful solutions 
to problems, favored disarmament and had even gone so 
far as to· seek an agreement with the British which se-
verely limited German naval development. 
Hitler· then· spoke of the Treaty of Locarno and of 
the· sac_rifice whicJ:t Germany had made by joining in the 
pact. Th~ Treaty of Locarno, he said: 
was intended to prevent for all future time the 
employment of force between Belgium and France 
on the one· side, and Germany on the other. Un-
fortunately the treaties of alliance that had 
already been made by France were the first ob-
stacle~ lain iti the practical path of this Pact, 
namely the Rhine Pact of Locarno. ,., To this 
Pact Germany made a contribution which repre-
sented the greatest sacrifice; because while 
France fortifies her frontier with steel and 
concrete and armament, and garrisoned it heav-
ily, a condition of complete defencelessness was 
imposed unon us on our Western frontier. Never-
theless, ;.,e abided by that obligation in the 
hope that we might serve the cause of European 
peace and advance international understanding by 
making a sacrifice which meant so muc_h for a great 
power. 
,',This refers to the Rhineland provisions of the treaty. 
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The agreement concluded between France and Russia 
last year, and already signed and accented by the 
French Chamber, is in onen contradiction to this 
Pact. This new Franco-Soviet Agreement introduces 
the threatening military power of a mighty emnire 
into the centre of Eurone by the roundabout way of 
Czechoslovakia, the latter ·country having also· 
signed an agreement with Russia. · 
Hitler reiterated his desire for an understanding 
with the French, once again charging them with unwill-
ingness to seek common ground with Germany. He then read 
to' the Reichstag a memorandum to the French government. 
It-had been.prepared earlier and was to be distributed 
to the Ambassadors of all the Locarno nations as he spoke. 
The memorandum said, in part: 
1. It is an undisputed .fact that the Franco-
Soviet Pact is.exclusively directed against 
· Germany. ·· 
2. It is an undisputed fact that in the Pact 
France undertakes, in the event of a conflict 
betwe·en Germany and the Soviet Union, obliga-
tions which go far beyond her duty as laid down 
in the Covenm1t of the League of Nations, and 
which compel her to take military action against 
Germany when she cannot appeal either to a recom-
mendation or to an actual decision of the Council 
of the League. 
3. It is an undisputed fact that France, in such 
a case, claims for-herself the right to decide on 
her own judgement who is the aggressor. 
4. The German Government are now constrained to 
face the new situation created by this alliance, 
a situation which is rendered more acute by the 
fact that the Franco-Soviet Treaty had·been sun-
plemented by a Treaty of Alliance between Czechos-
lovakia and the Soviet Union exactly parallel in 
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form. In accordance with the fundamental right 
of a nation to secure its frontiers and ensure 
its possibilities of defense, the German Gov-
ernment have today restored the full and un-
restricted sovereignty of Germany in the de-
militarized zone of the Rhineland. 
Hitler then read Germary' s proposals "for the cre-
ation of a system of peaceful security for Europe." 
These included German willingness to enter into nego-
tiations with France and Belgium on the sub_iect of a 
new zone, demilitarized on both sides of the border; 
the formulation of a.twenty-five year non-aggression 
pact between-Germany, France, and Belgium, with Great 
Britain and Italy as guarantors; a similar agreement 
with· the Netherlands; an air pa_ct with the Western 
powers; non-aggression pacts with the Eastern Euro-
pean states, provided :·that Lithuania would respect 
the autonomy of the.Memel Territory; and willingness 
to re-enter the League of Nations. 
The Chancellor concluded his oration with a glow-
ing defense of his own efforts on behalf of the German 
people. He urged them to give him a vote of confidence: 
I now beg the German people to strengthen me in 
my faith and through the force of their will 
further to endow me with the strength to take 
a courageous stand at all times for their honour 
and their freedom and their economic welfare. 
And I specially request the German people to 
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support me in my struggle to bring about real 
peace_ li 
On 8 March 1936, the New_ Yorl< Times printed the 
full text of Hitler's speech and indicated that his 
oratory efforts were rewarded with a five-minute stand-· 
ing ovation. 
While Hitler spoke, the German Foreign Minister, 
Baron von Neurath, received the ambassadors of Great. 
Britain, France, Italy ·and Belgium and handed each a 
copy of the Chancellor's memorandum. 5 In the Rhine-
land, as the sold_iers of the Reich entered the various 
towns and cities in which they would be stationed, 
crowds pou_red in to· the streets to greet them. Flags 
app.eared at windo'ws, church bells rang, bands played, 
and young girls showered the marching soldiers with 
flowers. In Cologne, the troops Paraded in Cathedral 
Square, and in Frankfurt's Roemer Square, a Nazi ral-
ly was held. Two hours after Hitler finished his ad-
dress advance units had reached Saarbrucken, only 
three kilometers from the French border. 6 
4Norman H. Baynes, The Speeches of Adolph Hitler 
April 1922-August 1939 (New York: Howard Fertig, 1969), 
pp. 1271-1302. 
5Mowat, Europe in Crisis, p. 47. 
6Newsweek, Vol. VII, No. 11, (March 14, 1936): 7,8. 
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The German government announced that trooo movements 
would continue throughout the next day and that soldiers 
would be stationed on the Rhine, in the Rhine \/alley, and 
between the Black Forest and the Rhine. Aachen, Trier 
and Saabri.icken were to be garrisoned "lightly," and Air 
Force squadrons were to be stationed at Cologne, Dussel-
dorf, Frankfort-am-Main, and Mannheim. An apoeal was 
is~~ed·to the German nation by the Minister of Propaganda, 
Joseph.Goebbels. He urged the citizens of the Reich to 
fly German flags as a symbol of their unity with those 
Germans who had died durin'g the World Har, whose sacri-
fice was no longer in vain. 7 
As night· fell over Germany·on 7 March, torch light 
parades lit un the skies in cities all over the country. 
In Berlin, 15,000 Bro~shirts oassed between cheering 
. ,' , 
crowds and paraded down Wilhelmstrasse. Hitler and his 
cabinet reviewed them from the balconv of the Chancel-
lory and listened while the marchers sang the familiar 
Horst Wessel Lied, "Today all Germany belongs to us. 
Tomorrow the whole world." 8 
7New York Times, March 8, 1936. 
8Newsweek, Volume VIII, No. 11, (March 14, 1936): 
7,8; Goldman, "Crisis in the Rhineland," o. 133. 
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International reaction was immediate. The Sunday 
New York Times carried banner headlines: 
"HITLER SENDS GERJ-AAN TROOPS INTO RHINELAND; OFFERS 
PARIS 25-YEAR NON AGGRESSION PACT; FRANCE MANS HER 
PORTS; BRITAIN STUDIES MOVE" 
In articles covering the entire front page and several 
full pap;es throughout the paper, British, French, Russian 
and other European reactions were recorded. The British 
seemed non-plussed, the French outraged, and the Russians 
angry but hot surprised. Americans seemed to share all of 
these er.1otions. The Times' foreign correspondents repDrt-
ed their observations in detail. From Berlin, Otto D. 
Tolischus ·wrote, 
The move was carri.ed through with that character-
istic German efficiency which drew from foreign 
military experts tribute to the German Army Com-
mand amid manifestations of both ponular enthu-
siasm and grave apprehension. It.brought back 
echoes of the last German westward march nearly 
22 years ago, but also it was made to look like a 
dress rehearsal for more serious business. 
The London correspondent wrote: 
Anthony Eden used strong words to condemn the Ger-
man action. . He said the British Government must 
consider entry of German re~ular trooos into the 
forbidden zone to be in defiance of treaty obliga-
tions and a flagrant breach of a territorial fron-
tier. ' 
He apparently had studied the situation carefully and his 
analyis was proved correct by subsequent events. 
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The fact is that at the bottom of their hearts 
Cabinet Ministers here are not so displeased 
with Hitler's proposals as it officially must 
be said they are. For some time past the de-
militarized zone has been written off as lost. 
A chance to obtain a solid counter-value for a 
hopeless item on the balance sheet appears 
attractive for practical politicians in Lon-
don. The real question awaiting reply is 
whether Hitler offers advantages that upon 
closer inspection may be found ephemeral 
once the fact of the illegal military occupa-
tion of the Rhineland is accepted without 
demur.9 
Experts from Europe'an press releases follow: 
From the Red Star, an Army organ of Moscow: 
The Rhine invasion is a new symbol of aggression, 
making Germany the hotbed o.f war throughout Europe. 
The .invasion and the Locarno Pact repudiation can-
not be justified: With unparalleled insolence Hit-
ler said each German had 18 nercent less land than 
each Russian .. Hitler has o·ften_ revealed that Fas-
cist Germany is dreaming of acquiring Soviet ter-
ritory - Let him only try it'. 
The Paris Independent: 
Hitler's present action continues in logical suc-
cession.the Versailles Treaty violations because 
the Allied Governments are divided. 
The Amsterdam Telegraaf: 
Germany invites Holland to particiD1?,te in its 
proposals, but Holland cannot enter into an 
agreement which would place her in the dangerous 
position of Belgium. 
9New York Times, March 8, 1936. 
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The Vienna Reichspost: 
The announcement of Germany's readiness to reenter 
the League of Nations is aimed to achieve favorable 
reaction in England, where such is considered most 
important, due to the Italo-Ethiopian situation. 
Journal de Geneve, Switzerland: 
It is clear that Hitler is playing for high stakes. 
He is capitalizing on the confusion into which 
France and Britain were thrown by Mussolini's action 
in Ethiopia, and the German press is using ratifica-
tion of the Franco-Soviet agreement as justification 
for these actions. 
The Berlin Deutsche Allegemeine Zeitung: 
. . 
We are.still ignorant of who will excite himself 
over Hitler's speech, but we suspect it will be 
France; but particularly toward France the Fuhrer 
directed a passionate appeal for reconciliation. 
The· London Sunday· Observer: 
Hitler's two new points are the suggestion that the 
covenant of the League of Nations should be com-
pletely disjoined from the Treaty of Versailles, and 
that the Rhineland should honestly be recognized 
as German fully and without impediment. On both 
points he is right. There can be no peace without 
elementary justice and common sense. There is no 
more reason why German territory should be demili-
tarized than there is that French, Belgian
1 
or 
British territory should be demilitarized. 0 
lOLi.terary Digest, Vol. 121, No. 11 (March Li, 1936), 
p. 12. 
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The London Times expressed similar sentiments, but with 
reservations: 
Though the realization of the constructive aims out-
lined in Germany's memo is greatly to be desired, it 
"is felt that the short cut of easy complacency to-
wards Hitler's violation of solemn treaty pledges 
might prove to be the longest and perhaps a di~astrous 
road. Great Britain has held France to the League 
covenant and the policy of collective action in Abyssi-
nia. She is in honour bound to remain true now to her 
own pledges in full considertion of France.11 
European condemnation was swift, but reserved. No one 
appeared ready to condone Germany's action, yet Hitler's 
offers· o_f harmony and agreement led many to consider the 
possibility of a trade - the Rhineland for peace. What-
ever else can be s_aid about th_e ,Rhineland crisis, it can-
not .be said that the British and French governments were 
taken by surprise. Niether were Germany's other neighbors, 
and although most of the European governments appeared to 
be outraged by the remilitarization of the Rhineland, 
their bellicose words were not translated into action. 
Their responses were, for the most part, rhetorical. 
Both Great Britain and France had suspected for some 
time that Germany might rearm the area. If the move had 
been anticipated, why had these two governments not formu-
lated a policy to deal with the threat? The evidence indi-
11The Times (London), _March 9, 1936. 
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cates that some contingency olanning had been done, but 
the key to the responses of Great Britain and France lay 
largely in their differing interpretations of what con-
stituted a threat to their own national interests and in-
deed as to what posed a potential threat to the peace of 
Europe. The British had pinned their hopes for peace 
basically upon reconciling Germany to a status quo, suf-
ficiently revised to. meet_Germany's legitimate aspira-
tions. Thisstance is reflected in Britain's position that 
Germany's move in the Rhineland was just a march in Hit-
ler's own back yard. The French, on the other hand, hqd 
attempted to increase.·their strength by means of a broad-
ened ·alliance syseem, pinning their hopes for peace on the 
ability to confront Germany with such overwhelming power 
that it would not dare attack France. 12 The lack of con-
certed opposition insured the success of Hitler's coup and 
allowed him to diplomatically stall until his march was 
indeed a fait accompli. 
12
Frederick H. Hartmann, The Relations of Nations 




The remilitarization of the Rhineland was a clear-
cut unilateral violation of international treaties. By 
reoccupying the demilitarized zone, Germany was in contra-
vention not only of the Treaty of Versailles, which Hitler 
maintained had b,een imposed on Germany, but also of the 
Pact of Locarno, which had been freely negotiated with the 
governments of France ·and Belgium and guaranteed by. the 
governments of Grea~t Britain and_ Italy. As a result of 
Germany's move, France now had every legal right anct cer-
tainly every military reason to undertake an occupation of 
the Rhineland. In spite of these facts Hitler's move went 
unopposed. 
From the moment of the German announcement, Hitler 
seemed virtually assured of victory, for although the na-
tions of Europe reacted with surprise and dismay, none 
took military action. As the nation most directly af-
fected by the German move, France was entitled to unilat-
eral military action as well as a request for assistance 
from the guarantors of Locarno. If France hesitated, the 
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initiative rested with Great Britain and Italy, the 
guarantor powers. Italy was under sanctions as a re-
sult of the Abyssinian embroglio, therefore responsi-
bility fell implicitly to Great Britain, a nation which 
was not inclined to support military action as a means of 
settling the dispute. 
If a forceful reaction was to be made, responsibility 
for making it clearly rested with the French government, 
and there weLe several .courses of action which it could 
take. The French· c'oul:d ignore the Locarno p'act and march 
into all or. part of the Rhineland on the grounds that this 
was permitted by,·Art'icle 44 of the Versailles t'reaty, which 
stated that any violation'of the Rhineland provisions was 
to be regarded as "a hostile -act, calculated to disturb 
the peace of the_world." Another alt~rnative was to post-. 
pone action until the League of Nations could convene and 
make a determination in the case. If the League found in 
favor of France, she could then either impose military 
or economic sanctions against Germany and call upon the 
Locarno guarantors for assistance, or forego her right to 
determine punishment independently and submit the question 
to her treaty partners for a joint decision. 1 
1Ernmerson, Rhineland Crisis, p. 48. 
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France was entitled to military action, and some 
French officials at least considered such a move. The 
French Ambassador in Berlin, Andre Francois-Poncet, urged 
"energetic reaction." Premier Sarraut broadcast a message 
of stern.defiance: never would France negotiate while 
Stra~bourg was menaced by German guns. But the Commander-
in-Chief of the French army, General Maurice Gamelin, 
warned his government that a war operation, however lim-
ited, would necessitate a general mobilization, a step he 
was not wil].ing to take. He did agree to rush thirteen 
divisions to the Maginot Line, and even this pusillani-
mous gesture provoked General von Blomberg into begging 
Hitler to at least withdraw troops from the cities closest 
to the French frontier, Aachen, Trier, and Saarbrucken. 
If the· French attacked, Blomberg told Hitler; the Germans 
would have to pull back without a battle, and thus suffer 
a humiliating moral as well as military defeat. Hitler 
remained resolute. He told Blomberg to wait, if necessary, 




Toland, Adolf Hitler, Volume I (Garden City, 
Doubleday & Co., INc., 1976), pp. 407, 40R. 
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The issue of retreat is a c0ntroversial one. As 
has previously been mentioned, the orders for Winteri.ibung 
stated that the troops were to stage a "fighting with-
drawal" if opposition was encountered. Hitler apparently 
did not believe that France would intervene, and many 
historians write that the German troops would have fled 
the Rhineland-had a shot be~n fired against them. The 
German Chancellor· certainly pondered retreat. On 5 March, 
he -.asked his adjutant, Friedrich Rossbach, whether the 
movement of.tro~ps could still be halted and when such 
a decision would become irrevocable. Rossbach replied 
that the movement of troops could still be stopped, 
but he could not say when the latest time for reaching 
a final decision might be. 3 Testimony at the Nuremberg 
Trials indicated ·that Hitler was resolved to withdraw 
the occupation forces as soon as France adopted a 
menacing stance. 4 But as the weekend passed, the pos-
sibility of a forced retreat became more remote. 
3 
Goldman, "Crisis in the Rhineland," p. 118, citing 
Friedrich Rossbach, Zwischen Wehrmacht und Hitler 1934-
1938 (Wcilfenbuttell, 1949), p. 97. 
4rbid., citing Trials, Volume XV, p. 351. 
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By Monday, 9 March, more than 25,000 German troons 
were in the Rhineland. While there were still only 
words from the British and French governments, the Ger-
man Chancellor was consumed by anxietv. He later con-
fided to his chief interpreter, Paul Schmick, that "the 
forty-eight hours after the march in the Rhineland were 
the most nerve-racking of my life." He also said that 
had the French retaliated, "we would have had to with-
draw with our tails between our legs, for the military 
resources at our disposal would have been wholly inade-
quate for even a moderate resistance."5 
Indeed, Hitler's anxiety was such that he shared 
it with one of his favorites, Albert Speer. In his 
memoirs, S-peer recalls the evening of March 7: 
The special train in which we rode to Munich 
on the evening of that day was charged, com-
partment after compartment, with the tense 
atmosphere that emanated from the Fuhrer's 
section. At one station a message was 
5
Toland uses these quotes on p. 408 without a 
citation. However, Hitler's anxiety is discussed 
by Carr, Arms Autarkv, p_ 67, and the conversation 
is referred to indirectly. Carr cites P. Schmidt, 
Statis auf diplomatischer Buhne, 1923-1945 (Frank-
furt, 1949), p. 230; and K. von Schuschnigg, Ein 
Requiem Rot-Weiss-Rot (Zurich, 1946), o. 43. 
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handed into the car. Hitler sighed with re-
lief. 'At l_ast '. The King of England will 
not intervene. He is keening his promise. 
That means it can all go weli.' He seemed 
not to be aware of the meager influence the 
British crown has upon parliament and the 
government. Nevertheless, military inter-
vention would have probably required the 
King's approval, and perhaps that is what 
Hitler meant to imply. In any case, he was 
intensely anxious, and even later, when he 
was waging war against almost the entire 
world, he always termed the remilitariza-
tion of the Rhineland as the most daring 
of his undertakings. 'We had no army worth 
mentioning; at that time it would not even 
have·had the fighting strength to maintain 
·itself against the Poles. If the French 
had taken-any action, we would have been 
easily defeated; our resistance would have 
'been over in a few days. •6 
· The causes- o.f Hi'tler's anxiety were evidently 
illfounded, in _spite of the fact that Germany's chances 
in the event of a full-scale French attack seemed hope-_ 
less .. The Rhineland action was no hastily conceived 
leap in the dark. · ·Hitler had carefully appraised his 
opponents. Not_only were French and British leaders 
preoccupied with Ethiopia, but their reaction to Mus-
solini's aggression in that country had convinced Hit-
ler that they possessed a general oaralysis of will 
and a reluctance to resort to any type of seemingly 
6
Albert Speer, Inside the Third Reich: Memoirs 
(New York: Macmillan Co., 1970), p. 72. 
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extreme and therefore dangerous measures in moments of 
crisis. The Chancellor had also chosen his time well. 
The French domestic situation militated against concern 
over foreign affairs. Hitler believed that the current 
French leadership lacked the resolution and the nerve· to 
undertake an invasion of Germany, and if France did not 
react forcibly to a situation so vital to her interests, 
then Great Britain.was most unlikely to do so. The 
Chancellor's concerns- prior to the coup were not whether 
France 'could'., but whether it 'would' march. Having con-
vinced himself that the French would not move to stop him 
he proceeded with the remilitarization of the Rhine-
land. Although Hit'ler was convinced that France would 
not act unilaterally, he did remain concerned about some 
kind of jointaction against Germany. He therefore con-
centrated on dissuadi~g _ French allies from choosing 
such a course of action. This could be accomplished, he 
believed, by promising to rejoin the League of Nations 
and to engage in bilateral agreements with his neighbors. 
Hitler believed the British could easily be convinced that 
the Rhineland effort was purely a German internal affair, 
and no threat to Britain or to the peace of Europe. 7 
7
Rich, Hitler's War Aims, pp. 86, 87. 
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To justify his actions and allay the fears of his 
European neighbors, Adolph Hitler accompanied the remil-
itarization of the Rhineland with a massive propaganda 
campaign. The German action, he said, had been under-
taken in response to the ratification of a French alli-
ance with Russia. This agreement, he charged, had com-
pletely upset the existing European balance of power and 
negated all the political and legal conditions under which 
the Treaty of Locarno had been concluded. He defended 
Ge.rmany' s right to sovereignty over its own territory. 
The remilitarization of the Rhineland, besides being 
essential. to German national security, was no more than 
an assertion-of.that right and a step toward securing 
justice for Germany. He reiterated his desire for peace 
and again offered to negotiate a series of new agreements 
. 8 which would guarantee the peace of Europe. 
Hitler's anxiety soon turned to exhilaration. His 
gamble had been successful. The French and British gov-
ernmentsprotested, as they had done the previous year when 
he announced his plans to rearm Germany and conscript 
8
rbid., p. 87. 
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an army, but again they did nothing. Britain deplored the 
breach of treaty, but did not see in Hitler's action a 
threat to peace. France dec:irledthat unilateral military 
resistance would be futile. Hitler held the weakest hand 
in the game, yet he had bluffed England and France into 
acceptance of his coup with little more than a murmur of 
disapproval. This is all the more astonishing given the 
stakes of the game. 
The remilitarization of the Rhineland was one of the 
boldest and most momentous gambles of Adolph Hitler's ca-
reer. He destroyed in one blow the major strategic ad-
vantage that the Allies had won as a result of their vic-
tory•in'the First World War. Hitler's action affected 
France most directly, because in the event of another con-
flict, German forces would be poised directly on the French 
border', while conversely, the French would be deprived 
of the advantage of being able to strike at Germany through 
a demilitarized zone. That this zone was also the indus-
trial heartland of Germany was hardly incidental. 
Hitler's action was also a blow to the small states 
of Eastern Europe for it virtually eliminated France's 
ability to come to their aid in the event of a German 
attack in that area. Poland and the nations of the Little 
Entente immediately declared their support for French mil-
itary action. 
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On the day of the remilitarization, the Polish 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Josef Beck, asked the 
French Ambassador in Poland to relay to Paris the mes-
sage that his country understood the difficult position 
of France and was ready to carry out its alliance obliga-
tions. The message was sent with the full approval of 
the President, the Inspector General of the Armed Forces 
and the Premier. The Poles considered the chances of 
armed reaction on the part of France extremely small, yet 
they.advised the Ge~mans of the position they had taken. 
The __ Polish Envoy-·to Berlin info1;med the German government 
that his country's non-aggression agreement with Germany 
did not restrict Polish freedom of action within the.f~ane-
work of the French alliance .. The Poles later charged that 
Pierre Flandin did not notify his government of the Polish 
declaration, possibly.because he was concerned that the 
stand taken by Poland might strengthen the position 
of French cabinet members who favored military action. 9 
9waclaw Jedrzejewicz, ed., Diolomat in Paris, 1936-
1939: Pll_!)_ers and Memoirs of Juliusz Lukasiewicz Ambassa-
dor of Forand (New York and London: Columbia University 
Press, 1970), pp. 8, 9, 
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On the surface, the Polish reaction was impeccably 
loyal, but it has been suggested that Beck was convinced 
that France would not resort to force, so he could safely 
make promises which he would never be· called upon to ful-
fill .10 
In any event, when it became evident that France 
would not take military action, the Poles found themselves 
in a difficul.t situation w;i.th regard to Germany. In less 
than a week, the Polish policy was reversed. Although 
Poland may have bE:_en willing to march against Germany, 
she could not afford to wait while France vacillated. 11 I . 
Th_e ! C_zechoslovaki_an government also offered support 
when the1Rhineland occupation took place. Czech Presi-
: I 
I ., 
dent E'duard Benes told the French Minister in Prague that I - -
his country ''.woul·d fo1low France, in accordance with our 
C 
treaty obligations, if she should draw the logical con-
c1usion from Hitler's act." As in the case of Poland; 
days passed and it became apparent that the French govern-
ment was not going to take up the Czech offer of military 
aid. So the Czechs, like the Poles, began to change course, 
10 
Taylor, Munich, p. 190. 
11 
Goldman, "Crisis in the Rhineland," pp. 211-213. 
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because they realized that they were going to have to 
deal with Hitler in the future, probably with little 
12 assistance from the French government. 
The Rumanian Foreign Minister, Nicolae Titulescu, 
conveyed assurances of his country's support as well, 
and became extremely critical of the French government 
when it failed to react forcibly. 13 Similar statements 
came from Hungary and Yugoslavia. 14 
In spite of their willingness to support military 
action, France's inaction made it necessary for the na-
tions of Eastern Europe to adjust their foreign policy 
to one·of accommodation.with the Third Reich. The real-
ity of their impotence was heightened by their total in-
ability to form a concerted opposition among themselves. 
Economic ties with Germany played an important part in 
their reluctance to take an overtly anti-German position 
in the face of French inactivity, and many of the Eastern 
European countries believed it would be economically sui-
cidal for them to carry out sanctions against Germany. 
12 Ibid., p. 214. 
13Elizabeth Cameron, Prologue to Appeasement: 
Studi in French Foreign Policy 1933-36 (Washington, 
American Council on Public Affairs, 1942). p. 199. 




Even though most of these countries were sympathetic to 
the French position, they believed far-reaching changes 
were about to be made in the European political scene and 
therefore they did not want to pre~udice their cases in 
15 
advance. 
A similar reaction occurreil in the Netherlands. Al-
though Hclland shared a common border with Germany and her 
s~curity was greatly affected by the remilitarization, she 
hesit.ated to condemn the. German move. Her actions are typ-. . . 
ic~l of the small states who claimed neutrality. Their 
weakness and size made it much easier to turn over the 
problem to the large:i;- powers than to suffer the consequences 
of taking a hard line." The Netherlands' economic life 
depended to a large extent on exports to Germany, anrl 
the Third Reich ow,ed that country a large sum of money .16 
The Soviet Union was also affected by the remili-
tarization of.the Rhineland. The Russians were aware of 
the strategic importance of a demilitarized zone in the 
Rhineland. They knew once the region was occupied and 
fortified by German troops, France woul.d be effectively 
blocked from aiding her Central and Eastern European allies 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid . , p . 219 . 
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if Hitler struck towards the east. If Eastern Europe 
fell under Nazi domination, Russia would no longer have 
a buffer between herself and the Third Reich. Conse-
quently, Joseph Stalin ordered the Soviet Ambassador in 
Paris to see Flandin on the day of the reoccupation and 
to offer him support in any move which France decided 
to make. 17 
During the Weimar period, the Soviet Union and Ger-
many nad ·enjoyed a close relationship, which included 
secret mili·tary agre~ments, but this relationship had 
been· destroyed.when'Hitler outlawed the German Communist 
Part arid violently attacked Bolshevism as the world's . . . 
foremost menance! Hitler's move led Stalin to adopt a 
policy_of coop~ration with various European anti-Fascist 
elements, one resuJt of which was the Franco-Soviet Pact. 
The Rus.sians urged action during the Rhineland crisis, 
stating that· the Rhineland coup was not an isolated in-
cident, but rather one of a series of acts motivated by 
an aggressive spirit and if it went unpunished, the re-
sults would be d·isastrous. However, the reality of French 
inaction made it necessary for them to adjust their policy 
to one of accommodation, just as the Eastern European na-
17Max Beloff, The Foreign Policy of 
1936-1941, Volume II (London, New York: 




tions were doing. The Chairman of the Council of Peo-
ple's Commissars, Vyacheslav Molotov, indicated his na-
tion's official position in the French newspaper Le Temps 
on 12 Ma.rch: 
The main trend among our people ... considers an 
improvement in relations between Germany and the 
Soviet Union possible. . The participation of 
Germany in the League of Nations would be in the 
interests of peace and would be favorably regarded 
by us.18 · 
The Rhineland ·episode points up the weaknesses in the 
Franco-S_oviet _Pact. The agreement required France and 
Russia to assist 'each other in the event of r::erman ag-
gression. Biit the pact was pure _illusion-it had no 
specifi~ military provisibns, and it did not require the 
U.S.S.R. to interv·ene if-Germany attacked Poland, or any 
of the eastern allies of France. The ma.Jar weakness how-
ever, was that Russia, having no common border with Ger-
many, could do nothing against the Reich, exc~pt through 
Poland, and there,fore could act only with Poland's con-
sent, and given the history of Polish-Soviet relations, 
this was extremely unlikely. From two viewpoints, there-
fore, the Soviet alliance was useless. If the Germans 
invaded Poland, the Russians were not obliged to inter-
18rbid., p. 53 
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vene, since their. alliance was with France. If Germany 
attacked France, Poland could refuse transit of Russian 
troops through her territory, and render the two-front 
response unworkable. The alternatives were air support, 
which was impractical as well as virtually non-existent, 
or an illegal march through hostile or at best, neutral 
territory. 19 
The Savi.et Union was committed by se"[)arate treaty 
to come to the aid of Czechoslovakia in the event of Ger-
man aggression,· but this was also contingent upon a 
French response. Th
0
e Soviet connection can be briefly 
summarized .. If Great Britain and therefore France adoo-
ted a hard line p·oiicy against Germany, the Soviets were 
willing to ioin the contest, either by marching through 
Rumania or by forcing their way through Poland, but only 
if the·western democracies were intent on crushing Ger-
many. The Ru-~stans harbored a dismal view of both French 
military capacity and willingness to react forcefully and 
believed it extremely unlikely that they would soon become 
. . . h · 1· . 20 a participant in osti ities. 
19Rene Lauret, France and Germanv: The Legacv of 
Charlemagne (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1964), p. 119. 
20 
Taylor, Munich, pp. 454-1+56. 
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As a .nation which bordered on the newly remili-
tarized Rhineland, Be]gium was of necessity involved in 
the crisis which arose over Germany's activity there. 
The coup in the Rhineland reminded many Belgians of the 
1914 affront suffered at the hands of their neighbor 
to the east. Because of the dreadful experiences of 
Be]g:ium at that. time, she had signed a military agree-
ment with France in 1920, ·a move designed to protect 
h'?r against another military incursion by Germany. Des-
pite these past. experiences, the Belgian government acted 
in a· restraine_d manner when the Rhineland crisis occurred. 
Belgian·Prime Minister Paul van Zeeland declared in a 
radio· broadcast_ from London on 13 March that Belgium 
had done nothing to justify a breach of the Locarno Trea-
ty and t,hat the reduction of his country's security was 
.. 21 
deplorable. 
Van Zeeland steered Belgium on a middle course dur-
ing the crisis, and actually became a mediator between 
France and Great Britain in their efforts to deal with 
the breach of treaty. Although Belgium was cast in the 
role of mediator, she insisted that she be compensated 
21 
The New York Times, March 14, 1936, p. 8. 
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for her loss of security in any new agreement which the 
Locarno powers might make. Several internal political 
considerations influenced the direction of Belgian for-
eign policy during the Rhineland crisis. Many among Bel-
gium's Flemish population believed that a close associa-
tion with France would involve Belgium in a war. Bel-
gian conservatives opposed the Franco-Soviet Pact, and 
the Belgian Fasci~t.Party·was rapidly gaining adherents. 
The failure.of France to act decisively when her own in-
terests were ~o. clearly threatened led these three groups 
to call for a disentanglement of Belgium from French for~ . ' 
eign policy. Although Belgium would probably have suo-
po~ted French action in 1936 as she did in the Ruhr oc-
cupation of 1923, the pressure brought to bear on the Bel-
giij.ri governnient ultimately resulted in a policy of neu-
trality, which unfortunately for the Belgians was to be 
as beneficial in 1940 as it had been in 1914. 22 
The other Locarno signatory, Italy, was also to feel 
the impact of the Rhineland coup. Italy was the pawn in 
the diplomatic maneuverings •,ecessitated by the Rhineland 
affair. .France was eager to maintain cordial relations 
22 
Cameron, Prologue, pp. 198, 199. 
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with Benito Mussolini and tried to convince Great Bri-
tain that League sanctions would only drive him into the 
arms of Hitler at a time when the western democracies 
needed his support against the German aggressor. 
In February, Hitler had attempted to bargain with 
Mussolini, urging him to support a German denunciation 
of Locarno. Hitler told the Italian dictator that the 
Rhineland occupation would _deflect world attention from 
Ethiopia and focus the wrath of the democracies on Ger-
many for a change. Although Mussolini saw the value in 
such a bargain, he was unwilling to denounce Locarno at 
that point, as Hitler requested. He did, however, assure 
Hitler·that he would not oppose a German move in the Rhine-
land. He also promised Hitler not to support sanctions 
against Germany. During the early days of the remilitar-
ization, Mussolini publicly remained neutral, and vowed 
that the Italians would carry out their Locarno obliga-
tions faithfully. But as the crisis wore on French and 
British inaction became a fact of life, and Mussolini be-
gan to move closer to the side of the Fuhrer and the part-
23 
nership known as the Pact of Steel. 
23Rich, Hitler's War Aims, pu. 88, 89. 
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Clearly the policy of drift followed by Great Bri-
tain and France in the days immediately following the 
Rhineland coup strengthened Hitler's hand and forced the 
other nations of Europe to realign and re-evaluate their 
policies with regard to Germany. The Rhineland episode 
dealt a death blow to collective security. No longer 
would a united front S'?rve as a deterrent to Nazi aggres-
sion. The.Chancellor of_ the Third Reich had penetrated 
its th.in· facade,· and discovered that it was built on 
words.alone. 
Hitler had survived the period of greatest danger 
to his designs, during which he lacked the means of a 
military defense, and had to ·rely on a series of judge-
ments that the western· democracies would not act to 
stop him. Hitler's generals had warned him in the most 
pressing manner no): to risk a move that was certain to 
provoke a French military riposte and could only result 
in the humiliation and defeat of the Third Reich. The 
German Chancellor disregarded their caution and when cir-
cumstances proved the generals wrong, Hitler became con-
temptuous of the old-guard conservative leadership and 
was increasingly convinced that his judgment was superior 
to that of his military experts. 
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Hitler's success in the Rhineland is often regarded 
as a turning point in the history of the inter-war years, 
and it is clear that if Hitler could have been stopped he 
should have been stopped in March 1936. It is difficult 
to draw a clear line across any given point of time and 
to claim that the errors of human judgment lie on one 
side and not the other. Nevertheless, a close examination 
of the reactions of France and Great Britain to the Rhine-
land crisis indicates that such a line should be drawn. 
Both· countries reacted to the crisis with a policy of mil-
itary and political paltering and prevaricating, a gross 
paralysis of will, qnd•incredible errors of assessment 
and judgment. The Rhineland episode set the precedent 
for avoiding the small risk, only to confront the larger 
risk in the future, a policy that was followed once again 
at Munich in 1938. 
CHAPTER VI 
THE FRENCH RESPONSE 
In March of 1936, France, together with her al-
lies, held a considerable military advantage over any 
possible aggressor in Europe. However, her military 
preparedness was based on defensive, rather than of-
fensive capabilities, and public opinion was decidedly 
pacifist. At that time French leaders were unwilling to 
risk a war that probqbly would not have been fought at 
all if they had been unwilling to call Hitler's bluff and 
force German troo~s .out of the Rhineland. It seems in-
credible now that such an obvious choice was rejected 
when the stakes for France and Europe were so high. 
Hitler's conviction that remilitarization of the 
Rhineland would not provoke a military rejoinder from 
his western neighbors proved correct. Both England and 
France were aware that Hitler regarded the recovery of 
full sovereignty in the Rhineland as a major oolicy ob-
jective, and the French government had been warned re-
• I 
peatedly by its agents in the Rhineland and its attaches 
in Berlin and Berne that a German initiative could be 
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expected soon. In fact, as early as 1932, the Ministry 
of War had informed the Foreign Ministry of continuing 
violations of the Rhineland restrictions. In reaction to 
these violations, the French General Staff drew up a 
retaliatory "Plan D," which provided for a French occupa-
tion of the Saar region and a further penetration into 
the Rhineland to a line from Trier on the Moselle River 
through Kai:serslautern and Landau to the Rhine.I 
There is no evidence to suggest that anyone seriously 
considered putting "Plan D" into operation on 7 March. 
Instead, it appears that in the months directly preceding 
the coup, the French government was either unwilling or 
unable to formulate a policy to deal with the impending 
crisis. They were definitely fqrewarned, but certainly 
not forearmed. The first intelligence reports concerning 
Germany's intentions to actually remilitarize the Rhine-
land were made in October 1935. The French Consul Gen-
eral in Cologne, Jean Dobler, sent a report which apparent-
ly reached the Vice President of the Supreme War Council, 
General Maurice Gamelin, who was also the Commander in 
1 
Taylor, Munich, p. 128. 
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Chief of the French Army. Gamelin's memoirs indicate 
that on 31 October, 1935, the day Dobler filed his re-
port, he (Gamelin) wrote to the Ministry of Foreign Af-
fairs: "The possibility of a repudiation of the Rhineland 
statute should be contemplated before Autumn of 1936 at 
the latest. " 2 This proves that the French military lead-
ership was certainly aware of the imminent danger to the 
demilitarized zone. 
Dobler reported to his superiors in Paris the secret 
construction of barracks, the use of Rhineland airfields 
by military aircraft, and the establishment of an army 
regional headquarters in Cologne. Over the next year, 
Dobler was the source of a steady stream of intelligence 
reports confirming clandestine preparations for the reoc-
cupation of the demilitarized zone. He reported that the 
local police for"ces were being augmented and militarized, 
and that stocks of munitions were being accumulated in 
the old Cologne forts. In addition, ground and training 
crews had arrived at the airfields and army camps, and 
maneuver areas were being established thir"oughout the coun-
tryside. Dobler supplemented these physical observations 
with reports of speeches by ranking Nazis, including Dr. 
2
Goldman, "Crisis in the Rhineland," p. 51, citing 
Genen1l Gamelin, Servir, Volume II (Paris, 1951), p. 
195. 
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Goebbels, and talks with local officials, on the basis 
of which he predicted open remilitarization in the spring 
of 1936. Confirmatory on-the-spot reports also reached 
Paris from the Consul General in Dusseldorf. 3 
In testimony before the Parliamentary Committee of 
Inquiry after the war, Dobler charged that this informa-
tion never reached the responsible authorities in Paris. 
Either the Foreign Minister had been too busy to read the 
dispatches or foreign service personnel had been unable 
or unwilling to give them directly to him. He believed 
that this was the initial cause of the French failure to 
act against Germany both nrior to and during the Rhine-
1 d 
. . 4 an cr1.s1.s. Although his reports went unacknowledged, 
it is clear that his dispatches were read. At least by 
mid-January 1936, the French pqlitical leaders were well 
aware that the Germans might move at any time. 5 
Another source of information concerning Germany's 
plans was Andre Francois-Poncet, the French Ambassador 
3 
Taylor, Munich, pp. 128, 129. 
4Goldman, "Crisis in the Rhineland," pp. 50, 51. 
5Taylor, Munich, p. 130. 
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in Berlin. He met with Hitler on 21 November 1935, to 
advise him that debate was beginning in the French Cham-
ber on ratification of the Franco-Soviet Pact. The Ger-
man Chancellor reacted by violently denouncing the pact, 
charging that it was a military alliance directed against 
Germany. Hitler's reaction convinced Francois-Poncet 
that the Germans would retaliate against the pact by 
denouncing Locarno and occupying the Rhineland: 
In a _long dispatch on 26 November I requested 
the government to consult upon what conduct it 
should fittingly adopt on the day when Hitler 
_passed fro!Jl words to action. Personally I sug-
gested that we should not wait for this to hap-
pen; we should forestall it by openly asking the 
question, thus.forcing Hitler to lay his cards 
on the table. Such a·policy might perhaps per-
suade Hitler to pledge himself to raise no fort-
ification ·in the Rhine zone in return for our ap-
proving the establishment of a few garrisons . 
· .. Or else, I urged, let us threaten to oppose 
with armed force the realization of his aims.6 
Faced with two concrete alternatives suggested by 
a man with first hand knowledge of the situation, the 
Foreign Ministry decided to accept neither of them. The 
French Foreign Minister told Francois-Poncet that if the 
French government appeared to admit any possibility of re-
vising the Locarno Pact the whole agreement might crumble, 
6 
Francois-Poncet, The Fateful Years, p. 189. 
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with Great Britain and Italy freed of their commitments 
in the Rhineland. The military high command knew of his 
November dispatch, Francois-Poncet said, and pressed the 
government to tell them what reaction it would have to 
a German move in the demilitarized zone. The answer 
was that in such an event the French government would 
depend upon the regular procedures of the League of Na-
tions.7 
On 25 January, the Sarraut cabinet took office, with 
Pierre Flandin as Foreign Minister. This was barely six 
weeks before the Germans made their move, and what little 
the French government did in the way of preparation for 
the anticipated blow was done during this short time. The 
Minister of War was General Joseph Maurin, a very defense-
minded individual who regaraed the Maginot Line as the 
ultimate safeguard against aggression from any quarter. 8 
Albert Sarraut was merely heading an interim minis-
try, maintaining the functions of government until the 
spring elections. He was sixty-four years old, a moderate 
who had been in and out of government office for thirty 
years. 9 It is important to note that Sarraut commanded 
7Ibid., pp. 189, 190. 
8Taylor, Munich, pp. 130, 131. 
9Ibid. 
91 
the allegiance of neither the left nor the right, and was 
in many ways, a man without a party. The fact that Hit-
ler chose March 1936 for his coup indicates that he had a 
clear understanding of the French political situation, and 
planned to take advantage of the struggles between the 
left and right which had weakened the French government 
almost to the point of impotency. 
Maurin, the Minister of War, had been chosen for 
ministerial.office by Flandin, with the approval of Mar-
shal Philippe Petain. To a 1935 request for a French 
armored force, Maurin responded in the French Chamber: 
How can anyone believe that we are still 
thinking of the offensive when we have 
spent so many billions to establish a 
fortified frontier'. Should we be mad 
enough to advance beyond this barrier 
on I don't know what sort of adventure?lO 
General Gamelin, regarded by Pertinax as one of the 
"Gravediggers of France," shared this viewpoint. The 
General was convinced that the concrete and steel of 
the Maginot Line could withstand all manner of assault. 
This reliance on the defensive was the credo of the 
French military leaders of the 1930's and lies at the 
lOibid., p. 131. 
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heart of their reluctance to commit the French forces 
to military action during the Rhineland crisis. 11 
Pierre Flandin is somewhat of an enigma. An avowed 
Anglophile, he cultivated English customs, dress and 
friendships, and sought to soften the blow of the Rhine-
land remilitarization with a revival of the Entente 
Cordiale. Although he appeared to support a forceful 
French response to Hitler's coup in the demilitarized 
zone, he has been reviled as a "Gravedigger," a German 
sympathizer, a fool, and a coward. He has also been 
touted as a farsighted statesman who merely lacked the 
f h . . . 12 courage o is convictions. 
These four men, Sarraut, Flandin, Maurin, and 
Gamelin shared the burden of formulating French policy 
immediately prior to and during the Rhineland couo. 
In mid-January 1~36, Gamelin prepared a memorandum 
on the growing German military menace. In it he esti-
mated Germany's effective ground strength at 790,000 
l.J,. 
Pertinax, The Gravedi ers of France: 
Daladier, Reynaud, Petain and Laval Garden 
York: Doubleday, Doran & Co., Inc., 1944), 
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men, although the evidence indicates it was more nearly 
500,000 at that time. Approximately 200,000 men made 
up the Labor Service (Arbeitdienst), but this groun was 
not armed in 1936, nor was it trained to any significant 
degree. His estimate apparently also included 40,000 SS 
men, a contingent similarly lacking in military signifi-
cance. Three days before he wrote the memorandum, he 
had been warned by his intelligence service that the 
Rhineland would be reoccupied in "the near future." He 
pointed out in his.memorandum that the loss of the Rhine-
land would put France's ·eastern allies at the mercy of 
Germany, but recommended nothin1s to counter the threat. 
His message was considered on 18 Januaryby the Military 
High Commission. The only action taken at the meeting 
was an agreement to request additional military apnropri-
. 13 ations. 
Gamelin's memorandum clearly exemplifies the French 
dilemna regarding German rearmament and the remilitariza-
tiort of the Rhineland. The Government of France was con-
vinced that once Germany remilitarized the Rhineland, the 
zone would immediately be fortified and the value of 
the Little Entente would be strategically nullifed. How-
ever, this conviction seems to have been outweighed- by 
13 
Taylor, Munich, p. 131. 
their exaggerated view of German military strength. 
The French leadership seemed so terrified of what it 
imagined German military strength to be that it was un-
able to muster the necessary resolve to lay plans for 
a counteraction in the event of a German reoccupation 
of the zone. Since the French government was reason-
ably well-informed as to the extent of German rearma-
ment the belief that the Reich exceeded France in trained 
' men and was about to pull ahead in materiel may have been 
due to the psychological effect of such para-military 
formations as the SA and SS, in spite of the fact that 
their miltiary utility was negligible. It could also 
perhaps be attribu.ted to the fear that secret German re-
armament was far more extensive than French intelligence 
had realized, or perhaps to a need on the part of the 
French government. to deceive itself with good excuses 
for refraining from action. It is also conceivable that 
the French fear was the result of a combination of all 
three. Whatever the origins of this exaggerated view 
of German might, it clearly palsied the will of the Fl'.:ench 
government and the French military establishment. 14 
lLr 
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Pierre Flandin spoke with the British Foreign Sec-
retary, Anthony Eden, on 27 January regarding the Rhine-
land issue. Flandin told Eden that his government was 
concerned about the possibility of German action in the 
demilitarized zone, and asked what advice Eden would 
give concerning the attitude the French government should 
adopt. Eden responded that he considered :i.t "improba-
ble" that Hitler "would take any precipitate action in 
the near future· .. " 15 Eden also told Flandin that the 
French governmen:t must decide for itself how much impor-
tance it attached to the demilitarized zone, and whether 
the French wished to maintain it at all costs or if they 
would prefer to bargain with the German government while 
the existence of the zone still had some value in German 
eyes. Eden suggested that if they wished to negotiate 
with Hitler, they should do so, but if they intended to 
repel a German invasion of the zone, they should lay 
their military plans. Fland.in replied that these were 
just -the subjects which he thought their governments 
should carefully consider and on which they should then 
consult. Eden remarked in his memoirs that "This was 
hardly the attitude or language of a man determined to 
fight for the Rhineland." l6 
15 Eden, Facing, p. 373. 
16 Ibid. 
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The Supreme Military Committee met in early Feb-
ruary with Flandin presiding. The French Foreign Min-
ister described the recent influx of intelligence in-
formation regarding the zone, and asked what measures 
could be taken if the Germans reoccunied the Rhineland. 
Maurin informed him that the French Armv had been or-
ganized solely to conduct a defensive camnaign, and had 
made no prenarations for offensive action, and was not 
ready for any type of military intervention. 17 
During the course of the meeting Gamelin, the Min-
ister of the Navy and the Air Minister all expressed 
similar views. When Flaridin voiced his astonishment at 
their position, General Gamelin told him that the Gen-
eral Staff was an executive organ, and th~t it was the 
government's responsibility to make the necessary deci-
sion. The military would then carry out the orders of 
the government. 13 
This canitulation on the nart of the Chief of Staff 
appears to be characteristic of the reluctance on the 
nart of French government officials to shoulder resoonsi-
17 
Goldman,· "Crisis in the Rhineland," PP .. 57, 58, 
citing Flandin's.memoirs, Politique Francaise, P. 195. 
' 
18Ibid., p. 59 
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bility and make decisions. ·The military refused to sug-
gest a course of action, instead insisting that anv re-
sistance, short of a general mobilization, would be in-
effective. Sarraut, who apoarently favored a forceful 
response, hesitated to make anv kind of commitment so 
19 
close to Che general elections. 
There is no evidence to indicate that between Flarl-
din's conversation with Eden on 27 January and the rat-
ification of the Franco-Soviet Pact a month later that 
the French-government was able to formulate a policy to 
deal with what had now become a certainty - A German 
reoccupation of the Rhineland. On 14 February, the 
British Ambassador asked Pierre F'landin for a soecific 
s.tatement of French policy regarding the Rhineland. The 
French Foreign Minister evaded the question, indicating 
that he would contact Anthony Eden regarding the matter. 
The Ambassador also approached Gamelin on the same sub-




Taylor, Munich, o. 133. 
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Finally on 2.7 February, the day the treaty with 
Russia was ratified, the French cabinet met to con-
sider for the first time what action should be taken 
when the Germans made the expected move. No record 
of the proceedings has survived, except for postwar 
testimony and the memoirs of Gamelin. The official 
formulation of France's Position, which was given in . . 
confidence to the Belgian-_Ambassador that same day 
and to Anthony Eden on March 3 was as follows: 
The French government will not take any isolated 
action. It will act.only- in accord with the 
cosignatories of Locarno. 
In case of a flap.:rant and incontestable viola-
tion (of the Rhineland Provisions)-the French . . 
government will immediately consult with the 
British, Belgian and Italian governments with 
a view to taking common action in execution 
of the League of Nations pact and the Locarno 
ag;reements. 
While awaiting the opinion of ·-the guarantor 
powers, the French government reserves the 
right to take all measures, including those 
of a military character, preparatory to such 
collective action as mav be decided uPon by 





This statement amounts to little more than pro-
crastination. It did not take into account the fact 
that French Allies might be unwilling to act, and did 
not deal with the possibility of unilateral action by 
France if her Allies did not rally to her aid. 
On_ the morning of March 7, the long awaited blow 
came. Premier Sarraut immediately called an informal 
meeting to attempt to establish one policy or solution 
out of the discussions of the past weeks. Present at 
' 
the meeting were Fla-q,din, Maurin, Joseph Paul-Boncour, 
who was France's· represen_tative'to the League of Nations, 
General Gamelin,-.and George S. Mandel, the Minister of 
Post and Telegraph. Mandel and Paul-Boricour urged Sar-
raut to issue a formal demand to the Germans that they 
withdraw. If they refused, the military would then force 
them to do so. Sarraut asked·· Gamelin whether F.rance could 
accomplish this if she were not assisted by her allies. · 
Gamelin replied that under current conditions France was 
strong enough to do so, but a war of long duration would 
favor 
trial 
Germany because of her superior numbers and indus-
. 22 capacity. 
22 
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That evening, a similar meeting was held, and it 
was decided that the Council of the League of Nations 
should be formally notified of Germany's breach of trea-
ty and that the Locarno powers, other than Germany, should 
be called to emergency session. Similar meetings con-
tinued on the eighth, with Flandin, Sarraut, Mandel and 
Paul-Boncour continuing to favor immediate military 
action. However, the military ministers urged caution, . . ~ . 
and Sarraut did not attempt ·to impose his will upon the 
cabinet. 23 
The French government,tmmediately received notes of 
support from Poland, Czech~·slovakia, the .Soviet Union, 
Rumania, Hungary and Yugoslavia• .. All t~ese nations in-
,· 
dicated their willingness to support France-. in the mili-
tary response to which she .. was by treaty.~ntitled, but 
the French held to their decision to appeal to the League 
of Nations. The British Foreign Office, which had made an 
urgent plea to Flandin to be "prudent, coolheaded and 
conciliatory," supported the French decision.
24 
23 
Arthur H. Furnia, The Diplomacy of Appeasement: 
Anglo-French Relations and the Prelude to World War II 
1931-1938 (Washington, D.C.: The University Press of 
Washington, 1960), pp. 190, 191. 
24 
Ibid., p. 191. 
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Eden informed Flandin that he had warned the German 
ambassador that the British government took an extremely 
serious view of the situation. He added that if the 
French would bring the matter before the League of Nations, 
as provided by the Locarno Treaty in the case of a non-
flagrant violation, the British government would support 
the French case. Since it had become an axiom of French 
foreign policy that France would not move against Germany 
without the cooperation of the Locarno signatories, it is 
not surprising that Eden's promise kept Flandin from press-
ing for military action. To the Eastern European nations 
who had offered support, this was tantamount to abandon-
ment. Eduard Bene~ wrote in his memoirs.a particularly 
apt summary of the situation: 
On March 7, 1936, Hi~ler, in reoccupying the 
Rhineland, dealt a decisive blow at the cause 
of European peace. Czecho~lovakia - and proba-
bly Poland also - was_-r~ady, to march· by the side 
of France against Germany. We had told the French 
Minister in.Prague that we should support France 
if she decided to reject the consequences which 
were imposed upon her by Hitler's attitude. The 
latter had broken the Treaty of Locarno and the 
Rhineland Pact and, because of this Pact, author-
ized France and Britain to go immediately to war. 
The Western democracies would have been able to 
stop Germany, whilst there was still time, in the 
pursuit of this criminal war. In my opinion, we 
were obliged to march at the side of these two 
Powers and we would have done so. But nothing 
happened. France thus committed the most dang-
erous of errors .... France did not act, when 
she had the right to do so in accordance with 
the terms of a· treaty signed by Germany and. 
concluded to provide for this particular case. 
102 
The Western democracies gave evidence of indeci-
sion, of weakness. and with a lack of fore-
sight which bordered on frivolity. This important 
fact was the cause of the tragic collapse of France. 
It was the first chapter-in the story of Munich and 
of the surrender of June, 19lf0. In March, 1936, 
France abandoned herself to her fate; it was thus 
the easier for her to abandon us to ours in Septem-
ber, 1938.25 · 
In choosing League action, France was taking the 
line of least resistance. ·Both the left and right opposed 
a military response. The French right charged that the 
French government had provoked Hitler. into·. the remilitar-.' . 
ization of the Rhineland by_ratification of the Franco-
Soviet Pact. While the French 'left did not defend Hit-
ler, it announced 'that it ._was madness ~o be~ieve that Ger-
many should continue· to endure tjl,e restriction of Ver-
sailles seventeen_ years after. the cessation of hostili-
ties. Both groups based their statements.to the over-
riding conviction that there should be "above all, no 
war'. 1126 In spite of the fact that.public opinion did 
;-
not favor military resistance·, the-solution ultimately 
lay in the hands of the French government, and the min-
isters had a difficult decision to make. The alternatives 
were to accept the breach as non-flagrant and await League 
action, or to view the coup as a flagrant violation and 
25Eduard Benes, quoted in Reynaud, In the Thick of 
the Fight, p. 125. 
26 Ibid., p. 127. 
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a cause for war. Hitler had carefully limited his troops 
and equipment in the Rhineland so as to avoid giving the 
impression that the move was a forerunner to invasion of 
either France or Belgium. The Chancellor's decision to 
employ moderation may also have been partially based on 
the idea that a French response would have been limited, 
if it were made at all. If, on the other hand, the French 
Army mounted a major offen'~'ive· to throw a few thousand 
troops out of the Rhinela!1l, ;it risked cormni ti:ing a major 
I ' • 
psychological error similar' to the Ruhr in•cursion, giving 
the world "the hateful spec table of war mo.ngering. 1127 
I 
In spite of some talk about using "a hammer to kill 
a fly, 1128 Flandin was appareritly convinced by Gamelin and 
others in the War Ministry that not only did France lack an 
adequate striking force, but that she also Ia.eked the where-
withal to sustain a lengthy 'assault. The evidence though, 
- ' 
indicates that the French military was adequately manned 
and well enbugh equipped to have answered the challenge 
and indeed to have driven the Germans out of the Rhine-
land.29 But it has also been suggested that the French 
Army of 1936 had no strike force capable of marching as 
27Eden, Facing, p. 367. 
28Taylor ,· Munich, p. 136. 
29This view is shared by Taylor, Rich, Shirer, Wein-
berg, and Goldm~n. 
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far as Mainz, or of occupying the entire demilitarized 
zone, and that it did not poss'ess a single unit which could 
be made instantly combat ready. 30 
The consensus of evidence indicates that France did 
have adequate military resources to answer the Rhineland 
coup with force, even had she been forced to act uni-
laterally. Such a move, however,·would have required a 
courageous and imaginative, as well as determir1ed, mili-
tary leadership. This Fran·ce did r,ot possess. The Gen-
eral Staff, by clinging to t;he belief that ~ts defensive 
concept was infallible, did much t~ underm~ne the French 
' will to resist a Rhineland OC!=!upation. Any army is only 
I 
as good as its leadership; and if the leade;rship refuses 
to lead, the cause is lost. Therefore the.question of 
whether France alone had t~e military capacity to reply 
forcefully is a moot point, since she obviously did not . ' 
have the will to do so, but it is clear that German 
strength was not nearly as great as was widely presumed. 
The French General Staff consistently overrated 
Hitler's military strength. As early as 1934, fears were 
being expressed in Paris that the illegal Reich forces 
had surpassed the French Army numerically and that Ger-
many's war industries would soon be superior to those of 
30
Emmerson, The Rhineland Crisis, p, 105. 
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France. During the last half of 1935, the question most 
often pondered by French military experts was not whether 
Germany could defend herself, but how soon Hitler could 
successfully launch an offensive. These alarms may have 
been voiced initially to arouse the French public to the 
need for greater rearmament, but there is no doubt that 
by 1936 the French Army high command had become convinced 
that Germany was an armed camp. Overestimates of German 
strength continued during the reoccupation, when General 
Gamelin numbered the troops in the Rhineland at 250,000, 
hl . h.. 1 . b 31 roug y ten times t eir actua num er. 
Flandin also had to consider future relations with 
Great Britain. Even thoug_h he favored military action, he 
believed that to force Britain to march against her will 
by initiating hostilities against the Reich would have a 
grave effect on Anglo-French relations. Once their ob-
ligation had been fulfilled, Flandin believed the British 
would repudiate other commitments to France and either re-
tire into isolation or negotiate directly with Germany. 
Nothing, he believed, could be worse for France than 
the collapse or even the weakening of Franco-British uni-
ty in the face of the German menace. 32 
31 
Ibid., p. 110. 
32Ibid., p. 113. 
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At Flandin's request, delegations from Great Bri-
tain, Belgium and Italy met on 10 March at the Ouai 
d'Orsay in Paris. The talks opened with the French For-
eign Minister attempting to put his colleagues at ease 
by stating at the outset that he did not expect any 
resolution to be made at the meeting. Instead he urged 
them to discuss the Rhineland situation and arrive at a 
"common position" which could be taken when'the Council 
of the League of Nation9_ met. A flagrant violation had 
occurred, he stated, and France had an incontestable 
right to act in order to force a German evacuation of 
the illegally occupied zone. France would,· however, res-
. ' 
pect th_e desire of Great Britain that she follow proper 
procedure and bring the question before the Council of 
the League of Nations. Flandin stated his assumption 
that the League Council would _endor-se any action which 
the Locarno powers decided to undertake.33 
At that point the formal cordiality of the meeting was 
destroyed by the emergenc·e of a basic disagreement between 
France and Great Britain. Anthony Eden pointed out that 
33 
Goldman, "Crisis in the Rhineland," pp. 241-243. 
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·the other League members were under no obligation to 
support France or the Locarno powers. If Flandin assumed 
that France would get automatic support from the League 
members, Eden added, there could be great difficulty in 
store at the League Council meetings. 34 
Flandin proceeded to outline the procedure which he 
believed the Locarno powers shoul_d follow. First, he 
' ' 
said, an ultimatum should be ·sent to Germany, demanding 
an immediate withdrawal fr,om
0
the zqne. Second, no neg-
otiations should be held as long _as Gerinany retained mil-
itary forces there. Finally,. if Hitler refused to with-
draw, the Locarno signatories 'would demand sanctions and 
start by removing their ambassadors from.Berlin as ages-
ture of discontent. The s·anctions would be applied in 
successive stages, beginni~g with economic measures but 
resorting to military ones if the former were ineffective. 
Flandin then announced, in front of the Italian Ambassa-
dor, that sanctions against Italy should be lifted if 
she would now support France. This statement widened 
the Anglo-French breach. Eden viewed this as a cynical 
action amounting to rewarding one aggressor if he would 
help deal with a more powerful one. 35 
34Ibid., p. 243. 
35 Ibid., pp. 24Lf-245. 
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Eden then announced that France should "not under-
take anything against Germany which would create an ir-
reparable situation." He assured Flandin that the Bri-
tish government had no intention of evading its obliga-
tions, but declared that the problem could certainly be 
settled by diplomatic means, and that his country would 
36 be glad to take charge of these. 
Flandin and his couhtrvmen had difficulty under-
J - • • • 
standing how the guarantor of a treaty co"uld be the 
mediator in a dispute involving a breach of that same 
treaty. Yet it was _clear from the·outset that this 
neutral role had been taken· on ·by Great· Britain and 
would be accepted by the French. 37 
The talks in Paris really accomplished little 
except to expose the Anglo-French antagonism which 
had been latent for some time·. Before adjournment, 
it was agreed that further talks should be held in 
London, where the League Council meetings were sche-
duled to take place.38 
36Eden, Facing, p. 393. 
37Goldman, "Crisis in the Rhineland," p. 245. 
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The Locarno powers met again in London on 12 March, 
and here Flandin was confronted with British intransi-
gence. He implored the British statesmen and politi-
cians to adhere to a strict interpretation of the Lo-
carno Treaty, to support France military action became 
necessary and to lead Europe in a crusade against Nazi 
aggression. The Locarno powers, including Italy, mere-
ly agreed that they would .pernit. the.Council of the 
League of Nations to .dec:1-de·, whE;ther or not, Germany had 
. ' ! 
violated the Locarno Treij.ty _. The Council·. met in Lon-
don between 14 and 17 March. Hitler sent v9n Ribben-
. ' . 
trop as his perilonal repr_e'senta.tive·. The Council de-
clared Germany guilty of a breach of her obligations 
under Locarno, but Neville Chamberlain and Stanley 
Baldwin convinced Flandin that the only course left 
was for France to negotiate with the Germans. This 
merely reinforced French policy, which had already 
become one of trying to save face with vociferous de-
mands for action which were carefully calculated to 
cover retreat. On the nineteenth, the Locarno powers 
submitted to von Ribbentrop a set of pro~osals aimed 
at achieving detente between France and Germany. The 
proposals asked if the Germans would submit their 
110 
doubts about the Franco-Soviet Pact to the Hague Court, 
and whether they would limit their forces and refrain 
from making fortifications in the Rhineland pending ne-
gotiations over Germany's counter proposals. 39 
With the submission of these proposals the French 
initiative was lost. She had surrendered her right to 
military action and passed her leadership to Great Bri-
tain. The fate of the Rhineland was sealed.·· Hitler 
could take his time in ~pswering the questions and in 
submitting counter proposals·. No French guns were 
aimed at Saarbrucken and n9 .F~ench soldiers were pre-
paring to cross the Maginot Line.· 
39 
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CHAPTER VII 
EARLY BRITISH RESPONSE 
When Her Majesty's Government are considering 
whether or not there is a basis of negotiation, 
I should like to suggest to my noble friend a 
test which they might apply: It is whether the 
agreement for which they are working will serve 
only to relax tension for a while, or whether it 
is in the true in.terests' of lasting peace. We 
must not perpetrate an injustice in order to get 
a little present ease; and.the Government qa~e 
(sic)to consider whether their decision gives 
peace, not just for an ·hour or a day or two, but 
in their children's time, That is the difference 
between appeasement and-peace.1 Lord Avon, Anth-
ony Eden, 1961 
Perhaps that is the lesson tqe Rhineland crisis 
taught, but in studying that episode, one is forced to 
the conclusion that in 1936, appeasement was the order 
of the day. While the French government preferred 
to think of Locarno and the Rhineland guarantees as 
non-negotiable, and therefore chose to put the whole 
issue aside andaNait the inevitable, it appears that 
only in retrospect did the British government reach 
the conclusion that the demilitarized zone was crit-
ical to the peace of Europe. Great Britain regarded 
the Rhineland as a valuable bargaining counter, one 
1Eden, Facing, p. viii. 
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which could be used to appease Hitler's appetite 
for aggrandizement while at the same time securing 
for Great Britain an air pact with Germany. Neither 
the French policy (or non-policy) nor the British 
took into consideration "the whim of a mad dictator" 
until it was too late. Hitler's sudden move left the 
two western democracies without a coherent policy, 
and neither was sufficiently prepared, on the spur 
of the moment, to formulate one. 
The key to understanding the position taken by the 
British government during the Rhineland crisis lies in 
an examination of several political and diplomatic 
developments which had just t'aken place. First, the 
British government had only recently changed hands. 
The elections held in the fal:(. of 1935 saw the victory 
of Stanley Baldwin, whose program was based on a ueace 
platform. Baldwin chose Anthony Eden to succeed Sir 
Samuel Hoare as Foreign Minister. These two men, along 
with Neville Chamberlain, the champion appeaser, were 
largely responsible for the formulation of British 
policy during the remilitarization episode. Domesti-
cally, the Baldwin government was caught between attempt-
ing to rearm, but without placing a strain ,in in<lus try, 
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and shoring up Britain's offensive and defensive cap-
abiliti.es in the face of a pacifist public opinion. 
Second, the issue of Italian sanctions, Anglo-French 
relations and the German revisionist plans combined 
to make a quagmire of British foreign policy. The is-
sue of Mussolini's aggression in Ethiopia loomed large, 
and Great Britain, still smarting from the Hoare-Laval 
fiasco, favored sanctions. F'rance, fearful of aliena-.. ·. ' . . . ' . . .. 
ting Mussolini, did not, Pierre Flandin was anxious to 
enhance Franco-British unity ·and offered to'support sanc-
tions in return for a Brit'ish agreement' re.garding the 
Rhineland. This offer was just. on·e of several attempts 
made by the French .,to secure a pledge from Great Britain 
concerning the sanctity of
1
the demilitarized zone. The 
British government steadfa.stly refused to accede to such 
a trade-off, and furthermore shpnned any statements re-
garding the demilitarized zone. From January 1935 
through pre-coup 1936, the British government resisted 
all French efforts to secure pledges or other statements 
on behalf of the demilitarized zone. Great Britain chose 
2 
only to reaffirm in general her fidelity to Locarno. 
2 . 
Furnia, Diplomacy, pp: 183-185; Emmerson, Rhine-
land Crisis, pp. 56, 57. 
The British government during this time practiced 
a double-edged policy with regard to Germany. Its min-
isters avoided anything resembling a direct warning re-
garding the demilitarized zone. In the face of Hitler's 
growing power and potential for mischief making the Bri-
tish wanted to avoid any statement which would definite-
ly commit them to some kind of military action or force 
them to climb down from some untenable position. But 
at the same time, they preferred Hitler to think that 
the British government regar,ded the Rhineland· statutes 
as inviolable. 3 
The Baldwin government was attempting to secure 
public approval for rearmament, an issue which placed 
the British government on· the horns of a dilemna. For 
the last fifteen years, British official policy had been 
to support the League of Nations and disarmament, under 
the mantle of collective security. While the French 
appear to have totally embraced this illusive doctrine 
and allowed its ideology to paralyze their will, the 
British took a more practical stance. The British gov-
ernment apparently realized that the Ethiopian crisis 
and German rearmament were seriously undermining col-
lective security, and although the French seemed con-
3Emmerson, The Rhineland Crisis, p. 60. 
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strained to bury their heads in the sand, the English 
decided to rearm themselves as a counter to this threat. 
In 1935, the Defense Policy and Requirements Committee 
was established. Baldwin presided over the corrnnittee, 
whose members included the Lord President, the Chancel-
lor of the Exchequer, the Foreign Secretary, and the 
three service ministers. It has been suggested that no 
single document goes so far to explain British foreign 
policy during the Ethiopian and Rhineland affairs than 
this committee's report, which was written under pre-
sure of Germany's expansion of her air force. The re-





It is of the utmost imp'ortarice that this 
should not become involved in war within 
few years. We cannot urge too strqngly. 
no opportunity shoul1 be lost to avoid the 
of war ... as long as p~ssible.4 
The possibility of hostile action by Italy in res-
ponse to League sanctions combined with fears of exten-
sive German rearmament to convince the British leadership 
that it must quicken the pace of its own rearmament pro-
gram. A report from the Air Ministry indicated that by 
fall of 1935, the Germans would have fifty squadrons, 
comprising 600 aircraft, ready for use. That same year, 
Winston Churchill made a comparison of British and Ger-
man air strength and concluded that the government's 
4Taylor, Munich, p. 227. 
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promise to maintain air parity was not being fulfilled 
and that Britain was entering a time of "perilous weak-
ness."5 
During the late 1930's rearmament in Great Britain 
was hampered by a stringent peace-time budget and quar-
reling often arose among the military ministers over who 
would get what. Fear of aerial bombardment and faith in 
strategic bombing had led Stanley Baldwin to ·declare in 
' ' 
the House of Commons as early as 1932 that·· 11,the bomber 
will always get through .. ,·,6 This faith· in air power 
and fear of aerial attack determined the course British 
rearmament would take, and fed Baldwin to seek increased 
spending for defense. 
The Defense Requirements Committee issued a series 
of reports in late 1935 estimating that Germany would not 
attain her intended naval strength until 191+2, that her 
army would closely approach the size of the French by 1939 
and considerably exceed it by 1945, and that the German 
Air Force would be formidable by 1938. The committee 
concluded that it was "unlikely" that the Germans would 
launch an aggression before 1942, but that the British 
7 should reach a reasonable state of preparedness by 1931. 
5Ibid., p. 234. 
6will Fowler, ed., Strate y & Tactics of Air Warfare 
(New Jersey: Chartwell Books, Inc., 1979 , p. 13. 
7 Taylor, Munich, p. 235. 
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In order to achieve this, Baldwin and his ministers 
sought to enter into negotiations with Germany so that 
their opposition in Parliament could not charge them with 
rearming precipitately. An attempt to negotiate would 
clear the air. Either Hitler would comply or he would 
refuse, in which case the British people would have a 
better view of the danger posed by Adolph Hitler. At 
,. 
the time, Hitler made fre~uent protestations of his 
peaceful intentions, and·dec~ied his total deyotion to 
Locarno and the demilitarized zone. Many Britons be-
lieved that any agreement s~gned by Hitler would be 
worthless, but others ·beli~ved t;:hat even if he signed an 
agreement and later repudiated his signature, Britain 
would have at least gained some time for her rearmament 
efforts, which were thought to require at minimum a three 
year effort. 8 
This policy has been regarded as foolhardy and cir.-
cui tous by many and Baldwin is often criticized for his 
attempt to lure support for rearmament in this manner. 
It has been suggested that the Prime -Minister could have 
been elected on a program of limited rearmament in 1935 
had he enlightened the British people to the potential 
8Emmerson, Rhineland Crisis, p. 59. 
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dangers of Adolph Hitler and German rearmament, a situa-
tion amply proven by British intelligence reports. 9 Such 
a policy would certainly have made the British response 
to remilitarization of the Rhineland much simpler. 
The British government was operating on th_e premise 
that France lacked the military and moral strength to 
respond forcefully to German aggression. At the same 
time, Eden and others suspected that the·French might 
seek to excuse themselves for not·fighting cin'the grounds 
that the British would not jo'in them. Nev'ertheless the 
possibility could not be entiFely ruled .-out· that the 
Sarraut ministry might react foi::cefully tq a coup, per-
haps even·ty mobilizing. If -that occuri::ed, Britain would 
be morally, if not legally, bound to support.France in 
punitive measures against Germiny, This possibility, 
coupled with the increasing l:i,kelihood of a fait accompli 
in the zone, prompted Eden to a'dvise the cabinet against 
adopting any attitude which might oblige the government 
to either fight for the zone or abandon it in the face 
f G . 10 o a erman reoccupation. 
9winterbotham, Nazi Connection, pp. 126, 127. 
lOEmmerson, Rhineland Crisis, p. 61. 
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In early 1936, at the suggestion of the British 
cabinet and under the direction of Anthony Eden, the 
Foreign Office conducted a study of Locarno, the Rhine-
land statutes, the strategic significance of the zone, 
and its impact on the issue of British rearmament. The 
officials first studied and evaluated the positions of 
the Soviet Union, Belgium and Italy with regard to the 
maintenance of the demilitarized zone. Cognizant of the 
; 
fact that Russia was committed by the Franco-Soviet Pact 
only in the event of a direct attack on France, they 
reached the conclusion tha·t· the most Russia was likely 
to offer in the event of a German reoccupation was ad-
vice. Belgium, on the other hand was a Locarno signa-
tory and vitally interested in maintaining the demili-
tarized zone because it bordered on her own frontiers 
as well as those of France. Since Belgium was not a 
party to the Franco-Soviet Pact, if the Cermans used that 
as a pretext to reoccupy the zone, the Belgian govern-
ment would have a legitimate grievance and could apoeal 
to the League Council. The ministers also speculated 
that Belgium would follow the French lead in any reac-
tion to a breach of treaty, in.s])i te of the fact that the 
Belgians, like the English, did not believe the zone 
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could be preserved indefinitely. As a guarantor of Lo-
carno, Italy had the same obligations as Great Britain, 
but there was very little expectation that the Italian 
government would honor them. The heavy drain on Italian 
resources, the international animosities engendered by 
the Abyssinian conflict, and the imposition of League 
sanctions all precluded Italian cooperation with the 
other Locarno powers in any actiop aga_inst GerJ11any, who 
had not joined in the sanction's f1.~ainst Italy .. Italian 
inaction would repay this favor,,while a crisis in the 
Rhineland would benefit Italy by diverting·world attention 
. -
from the Ethiopian _situation .. As matters s:ood, the Bri-
tish government concluded that Italy would be most like-
ly to do nothing in the event of a German remilitarization 
of the Rhineland.11 
In addition to estimati_ng the probable reactions of 
the Soviet Union and the Locarno signatories, the Foreign 
Office also assessed the military, political and diplo-
matic repercussions of a remilitarization of the Rhine-
11Lawrence Warner Hill, "British Official Reaction 
to the Rhineland Crisis, November 1935-May 1936," Ph.D. 
dissertation, Texas Christian University,· 1972, Univer-
sity Microfilms1, Ann Arbor, Mich .. ' 1972, ?P- 74, 75. 
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land. In early January 1936, Foreign Office leaders 
requested that a military evaluation be made by the 
appropriate departments. Anthony Eden raised two spec-
ific questions before the Committee of Imperial Defense: 
(1) Of what defensive value would the demilitarized 
zone be to France, Belgium and Great Britain; and (2) 
Did the zone constitute any obstacle to the defense of 
Germany against an attack b'y the" we_stern P,?wers? On 
2 7 January, in response tci Eden's inquirie_s ·, the Sec-.. 
retaries of State for Air and ~ar·forwarded;reports to 
the Foreign Office. Their conclusions were that the 
Rhineland zone was of ~egligifile _defensive value to the 
western powers and constitu_ted no obstacle to the de-
fense of Germany in the event of an air attack. They 
reported that modern aircraft range capabiTities elimi-
nated the necessity for Germ.any "to establish permanent 
air bases there. On the other-hand, if a land attack 
was launched against the Reich, the Germans possibly 
would have to divert aircraft from other areas to de-
fend the frontier. This would weaken the air defense 
of Germany as a whole. In addition, if the zone re-
mained demi).itarized, German anti-aircraft _equipment 
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would have to be positioned further back from the fron-
tier, which would allow attacking forces some tactical 
12 advantages. 
This report, coupled with the Foreign Office assess-
ments of the zone's almo~t negligible political value led 
the British Government to conclude that the Rhineland 
demilitarized zone had one significant value - as a basis 
for negotiation. What _emerged· from ,the study was a Bri-
tish policy plan which favored negotiation and peaceful 
remilitarization of the Rhi'neland. This would·necessi-
tate a revision of Locarno. In return for,. remili.tariza-
tion, Great Britain wanted an.air pact and:some guaran-
tee of the security of Cent,ra-1 and Eastern European al-
lies of France, who wouldibe adversely affected by remil-
. . . 13 itarization. 
12 Ibid., pp. 67-75. Hill uses·material from the 
British Public Record Office in London. The documents 
concerning the Rhineland affair remained closed until 
1968, when the British government repealed the old 50 
year rule, and this opened them for use. In this sec-
tion he cites "Secret" C.I.D. papers, Air Ministry pa"[)ers, 
and minutes of the Foreign Office from the month of Jan-
uary, 1936. 
13 
Ibid., pp. 74, 75. 
12 3 
This policy plan, although practical in some ways, 
ignored the significance of the Rhineland for the rearm-
ament of Germany. If the British wanted only time to re-
arm and prepare, was it not foolhardy to return the 
Rhineland to total German control? Demilitarization meant 
that there was to be no manufacture of armaments or muni-
tions in the zone. Krupp and I. G. Farben had been spec-
ifically prohibited from ma:nufactm;ing weaponry, and many 
of the Krupp works had literally been obliged to beat 
their swords into plow shar·eJ. However, this treaty im-
posed hiatus actually worked to the advantage of the Reich, 
because Krupp entered the, cru·c:i.al ·1930' s with modern faci-
lities and techniques. The restoration of German sover-
eignty in the Rhineland would mean the end of limitations 
on the manufacture of weaponry·, and the "Arm_orers of the 
Reich" could begin to produce openly and in unlimited 
quantity what they had been turnin•g ·out secretly for at 
14 
least three years. 
The British policy pian also failed to take into 
account the psychological value of the demilitarized zone. 
It remained to the Germans the last remnant of the Ver-
14william Manchester, The Arms of Krupp 1587-1968 
(Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown and Comoany, l§bli1, 
p. 324. 
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sailles diktat and if it could be regained by the Fuhrer 
so easily, what might the western democracies accede to 
in the future? Conversely, abandonment of the demilitar-
ized zone would mean the end of collective security and 
the vittual desertion of Central and Eastern Europe by 
the western democracies, a capitulation which would cast 
them in the role of craven cowards in the eyes of the 
15 
world. 
A major consideration··a:d_dressed by '·the Foreign Of-
fice was how to handle French recalcitrance., It was 
agreed that the British would attempt to convince France . . 
that public opinion in neither country would, support mil-
itary action, and that neither country was prepared for 
war with Germany. If this.failed, they could then insist 
that the Rhineland problem had assumed the character of a 
Franco-German dispute which ·:should be handled by the ar-
bitration procedures set forth in the Covenant of the 
League of"Nations.16 
15Goidman, "Crisis in the Rhineland," p. lfl8. 
16ttill, "British Official Reaction," p. 75. 
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Clearly, British prospects for success in negotia-
ting a settlement with Germany appeared bleak, but in the 
opinion of Anthony Eden and other Foreign Office officials, 
Europe stood at the crossroads and the only hope for Euro-
pean peace and stability lay in curbing Germany. This, 
they believed, was impossible until Britain and France 
were in a stronger military position. The British be-
lieved they could buy the t:i,me .-needed for rearmament and -. ' . 
simultaneously secure ,a be.tter • agreement than Locarno by . ' ,, ' , . . ' 
sacrificing the demil{ tari'zed. zone.'. ,The, Foreign Office 
determined, therefore, that an attempt should be made to 
forestall an impending crisis oyer_ the' Rhineland in order 
to prevent a greater catastroph~. 17 
' 
Eden reported his conclusions and those of the For-
eign Office to the British Cabinet o_n february 14: 
Taking one thing with another, it seems, · unde-
sirable to adopt an attitude where we would 
either have to.fight for the zone or abandon 
it in the face of German reoccupation. It would 
be preferable for Great Britain.and France to 
enter betimes into negotiations with the German 
Government for the surrender on conditions of our 
rights in the zont while such surrender still has 
bargaining value. 8 
17 
Ibid., p. 77. 
18Eden, Facing, P~- 375, 376. 
12 6 
The Foreign Office had concluded that to wait and 
merely react to Hitler's initiatives was to court dis-
aster, yet that is exactly what the British government 
did. The Cabinet was deeply involved in consideration 
of a forthcoming "British White Paper" on rearmament 
and in the establishment of a new ministry for the coord-
ination of imperial defense. Consequently, with apparent 
indifference to the urgency o{ ith"~ Rhinel;and situation, 
the Cabinet took no immediate a'.ction on .Eden's recom-
mendations other than to refer ,h_is · sugges·tioris' to the 
Cabinet Committee on German~. '£qr fu~ther study . 19 
During the days following the 27 February ratifica-
tion of the Franco-Soviet Pact, a series. of developments 
occurred which unders.cored the differences between French 
and English attitudes toward .the zone. ··The ·British were 
intent upon negotiating some ··,air and arms agreements with 
•' 
Germany using the zone as a bargaining point, in soite of 
the fact that the Rhineland was not theirs to p,:ive away. 
They had decided to approach the Germans, secure a working 
agreement with them, and then submit the oroposals to the 
French as the very best of a bad deal. But Eden ercountere<l 
Pierre Flandin at a meeting of the League Council in Geneva 
19Hill, "British Official Reaction," p. 77 
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on 3 March. The Frenchman asked for specific assurances 
that England would assist his country in upholding the 
Rhineland statutes. This created an extremely awkward 
dilemna for Eden. He could hardly promise to support 
Articles 42 and 43 when the British policy makers had 
just dismissed them as non-vital. Nor ·could he admit that 
his government was preparing to negotiate the articles out 
of existence. Neither·: collld be refuse to reaffirm Great 
Britain's existing commitments re~arding th~ demilitarized 
zone without expecting his 6ouhtry to l;>e:censured in France 
: ' . 
for taking a selective attitude toward her treaty obliga-
tions. This would almost ce:r:tainly have provoked the 
French government into.retaliating.by,-refusing to impose 
oil sanctions against Mussolini on the grounds that French 
security required a strong ~hd friendly Italian ally. 20 
Eden evaded the issue. Flan.din· told the Foreign Secre-
tary that the French government had made a decision as 
to what action it would take in the event of a German 
reoccupation of the demilitarized zone. He also told him 
that in the event of a flagrant breach of treaty by Ger-
many, France would instantly inform the League Council 
and consult Great Britain, Belgium and Italy in order to 
20 
Emmerson, Crisis in the Rhineland, p. 69. 
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determine a concerted course of action. France reserved 
the right to take any preparatory measures, including 
military ones, in anticipation of collective action by 
the League and the guarantors of Locarno. The French 
plan was set forth in a memorandum which Flandin subse-
quently sent to Eden. 21 Eden confined himself to the 
reply that he would report :·the ·French Government's posi-
tion to the cabinet, and -then adivse his counterpart 
of their response. He never-did so. 22 
The League was meeting i~ Geneva to discuss the im-
, 
position of oil sanctions-against ·Mussolini. At the sui:t-
gestion of Flandin, the Council agreed to postpone action 
until 10 March. This proved to be fatal, because by 10 
March the ·Abyssinian crisis had been relegated to a very 
minor issue due to the actions of Adolph Hitler on the 
seventh.23 
21 
Eden, Facing, p. 378. (see page 98) 
22 
Reynaud, In the Thick, p. 122 
23Eden, Facing, p. 379. 
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The British interpreted the French memorandum .to mean 
that they were not planning to take immediate action in 
the event of a German reoccunation, but were counting on 
Great Britain's support to maintain the demilitarized 
zone. They then concluded that they must negotiate with 
the Germans on the subject of the zone while such action 
was still possible. 
Anthony Eden detailed the' ·urgency of t}-te situation 
in his memoirs: 
There was not one man in a thousand in the country 
at that time prenared to take physical·action with 
France against a German reoccunation of the Rhine-
land. Many went further than this .and thought it 
unreasonable that Germany should not·be allowed to 
do as she wished in her own territory, nearly twenty 
years after the end of the war. These opinions were 
represented among my colleagues, but I knew that I 
must rebuild the Anglo-French alliance for the sake 
of both our countries and.that the Locarno Treaty 
must be kept alive, as the most effective deterrent 
to Hitler in the future.24' 
To achieve this, Eden suggested that his government 
take the initiative toward the German government and begin 
a discussion of an air pact. On 6 March, Eden saw the 
German Ambassador and asked him to "refer to the Chancel-
lor the possibility of the opening of serious discussions 
on the Air Pact." The Ambassador agreed, but remarked 
24 Ibid. , p. 380. 
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that he had received warning from Berlirt that a special 
messenger was on-his way to London with an imoortant 
declaration for Eden from Hitler.25 
Time had suddenly run out and the moment of truth 
arrived. The British government's careful formulation 
of a policy was virtually nullifed because they had pre-
sumed that sufficient time remained to achieve a settle-
t • ,· 
ment by means of negotiation. They found their position 
of strength: abr~ptly ~nd .sl:r,ious ly, undermined, because 
the best possible bargaining .counter, the Rhineland demil-
itarized zone, had vanished. . . ' 
.Anthony E?en was the first member of the British 
government to lc:,arn of.Hitler's coup. He is generally 
regarded by historians as an opponent of appeasement, 
. 
because iri· F1;bruary'l938; he resigned his office rather 
than carry out the appeasement policy of the Chamber-
lain government. Yet he was unable in March 1936 to do 
other than compromise with a man who he feared really 




Goldman, "Crisis in the Rhineland," p. 169 
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After listening to the German Ambassador read Hit-
ler's memorandum on the morning of the seventh, Eden ad-
vised him that "The effect of this unilateral repudiation 
of a treaty upon His Majesty's government must inevitably 
be deplorable." 27 He did, however, add that he considered 
Hitler's new attitude toward the League to be imoortant. 28 
When the German Ambassador left, Eden immediately 
summoned the French Jµnbassad?r .. Seeking to placate the 
French and restrain them from taking any dangerous steps 
that might. lead to war, he informed him that the British· 
cabinet would want ·to consid~r the memorandum on Monday 
morning and then the situation could be discussed fully 
and frankly by the two governments. This indicated that 
the Foreign Secretary expected at least a forty eight 
hour delay in French military action, the period during 
which any decisive counter attack should have been made.29 
It is important to note that at no time during this criti-
cal period did the French government request any British 
27 
Eden, Facing, p. 381. 
28 
Ibid., p. 382. 
29 
Ibid. p. 383. 
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military assistance or indicate in any way that they were 
30 
considering a hostile response. Eden and Flandin were in 
constant telephone contact throughout 7 and 8 March. In 
addition, the Foreign Secretary met with the Prime Minis-
ter and the two menagreed that Hitler could not be be-
lieved, but that there was no public support in Great Bri-
tain for a military move. They concluded that there was 
nothing to do but call a cabinet meeting for Monday morn-
ing, and wait to see what France did.31 
It has been suggested that the British king, Edward 
VIII, who had maintained a close friendship with the Ger-
.' 
man Ambassador, intervened in the Rhineland crisis and 
told his Prime Minister· that he would abdicate if he made 
war. Whether he actually did intervene has never been 
satisfactorily determined. The Germans were nevertheless 
convinced that he was on their side during the Rhineland 
dispute. 32 
On Monday, 9 March, the Br-itish cabinet met and 
agreed that Great Britain should restrict her reaction 
to support for a formal condemnation by the League and 
3oF . . D. 1 urnia, ip omacy, pp. 
31Eden, Facing, pp. 385, 
192, 193. 
386. 
32Goldman, "Crisis in the Rhineland," pp. 176, 177, 
citing Fritz Hesse, Hitler and the English (Wingate,.1954), 
pp. 21, 22. 
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assurances for France and Belgium that Britain would ful-
fill her Locarno obligations. 33 That same day, Anthony 
Eden addressed the House of Commons and stated the British 
official position regarding the German coup, He said 
there was no reason to believe that the German action 
implied a threat of hostilities. He did say, however, 
that in the event of an actual attack on France or Bel-
gium, the British would regard themselves as in honor 
bound t.o come to the aid of the country attacked. 
Also on the 9th, an article appeared in The Times 
(London) which perhaps best describes the reaction of the 
British nation to the German reoccupation of the demili-
tarized zone. Entitled "A Chance to Rebuild," it stated: 
The Locarno agreement was in some ways ahead of its 
time. So much that it was never in fact allowed to 
create the conditions requisite to that frahk under-
standing between France and Germany which was and is 
the first essential of European stability. 
British opinion will be nearly unanimous in its de-
sire to turn an untoward proceeding to account and, 
far from weakening the regime of treaties, to seize 
the opportunity of broadening ancl strengthenin)l the 
collective system which opens with the German offer 
of reentry. . The old structure of European 
peace, one sided and unbalanced, is nearly in ruins. 
It is the moment, not to despair, but to rebuild. 
Hitler's Saturday surprise had caught both the French 
and British governments off guard. The week-end passed 
without significant response to Hitler's aggression, and 
33Eden, Facing, pp. 387 1 388, 
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by mid-week it was apparent to Germany and the rest of 
the world that neither the French nor the British would 
attempt to e_iect the Germans from the R.hineland. The 
cumbersome process of League deliberations was called into 
play, and Hitler merely had to sit back and await the out-
come, already convinced that victory was his. 
CHAPTER VIII 
STALEMATE 
The rearmament of the Rhineland brought with it a 
change in international diplomatic leadership. Paris 
had for generations been the seat of diplomatic initia-. . 
tive and achievement, but due to French inaction rl.uring 
the Rhineland crisis, that leadershio fell bv default 
to Great Britain. It is significant that the center 
for maintaining the peace of F.urone shifted to London 
both symbolically and physically. The traditional home 
of the League of Nations was Geneva, yet when the League 
Council met to consider the Rhineland .gue.stion, deliber-
ations were held in Lotidon at St. James Palace. By lh 
March, the day on which the League Council held its 
first session, it was apparent that Great Britain had 
assumed the initiative and had undertaken the role of 
mediator. 
Because of this shift in diplomatic responsibility, 
the failure of the western democracies to oust the Ger-
mans from the Rhineland is generallv attributed to Great 
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Britain. Hriting in October of 1936, Reinhold Nie-
buhr stated that the British consistently employed a 
type of diplomacy best termed "muddling through." He 
asserted that the resolution of the Rhineland crisis 
hinged on Britain's response and because the British 
had adopted a "wait and see" attitude, the rest of 
Europe had to do likewise. Niebuhr arguetlthat Germany's 
immediate goal was to wrest the hegemony of the conti-
nent from France without directly challenging either 
France or Soviet Russia. The Nazi purnose as he saw 
it was to exPand ~t the expens:e ·of the smaller nations 
of Europe while avoiding conflict with the larger ones. 
The importance of Bri:tt'sh diplomacy in relation to this 
ambition arose from the fact'that the cornerstone of 
Nazi international Politics was to do nothing which 
would arouse the British and to seek by every nossible 
means to detach England from her.alliance with France. 
-
The Anglo-German Naval Agreement was Hitler's notice 
to the world that the one error of the German imperia-
lists in 1914 - which he intended to avoid - was to 
challenge the British Navy. Niebuhr charges Hitler 
with taking advantage of Great Britain's sense of 
fair play. His article concludes on a prescient note: 
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Even if war is avoided for five or ten vears at 
the price of an unchallenged exnansion of Germany, 
Britain will ultimately have to face a triumphant 
Germany for a final _ioining of the issue. The 
assumption of the British pro-German party that 
justice to Germany, allowing her a moderate ex-
pansion, will ,avert war fails to take the dyna-
mics of politics into account, Particularly the 
dynamics of a fascist dictatorship. Germany is 
bound to regard every successful test of strength, 
not as an appeasement of her just grievances, but 
as a preliminary victory which encourages to a more 
ultimate conflict. Brita:i,n thus threatens to re-
peat the mistake of 1914 in encouraging Germany by 
her indecision to hope for an ultimate British 
neutrality. . The peace of today has been 
bought at the price of ihe certainty of war tomor-
row.l · 
British nublic opinion,. in additfon to being dan-
gerously pacific, also held that Hitler's move in the 
Rhineland was: just a "walk in hi-s o,m back garden. "2 
In addition, the British king was a friend to several 
German diplomats and wa.s known to have pro-German senti~ 
ments. Add to this the fact that many British govern-
ment officials nublicly eschewed military action against 
Germany and there can be little doubt that the shift in 
diplomatic initiative came as good news to the Chancellor 
of the Third Reich. 
1 
Reinhold Niebuhr, "Which Way Great Britain?" Cur-
rent History XLV (November, 1936)·, 2. 
2 
Eden, Facing, p. 389. 
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In spite of the fact that the British Foreign Office 
had taken the lead in attempting a settlement of the Rhine-
land crisis, the League of Nations met at the request of 
the French government. Pierre Flandin represented his 
country at the meetings, and took the floor as the first 
speaker at the ouening session. He emuhasized that the 
Treaty of Locarno compelled him to bring the question 
before the League Council. He denailed the German breach 
of international law and then, alrnost self-righteously, 
stated that the French government, by bringing the issue 
before the League had not so much exercised a right as 
performed a duty. "If it were only a question of rights," 
he said, the Locarno pact entitled France "to take strong 
and decisive measures forthwith." But because his gov-
ernment sought above all else to maintain the peace, 
France voluntarily refrairied from taking military action. 3 
If Flandin had really expected the League of Nations 
to take action against Germany he could have specified, 
when submitting the dispute to the League Council, that 
Germany's action constituted a flagrant breach of the 
Treaty of Versailles and the Pact of Locarno. He did 
3Goldman, "Crisis in the Rhineland," DP. 264, 265, 
citing League of Nations Journal, 1936, Minutes of the 
ninety-first (extraordinary) session of the Council, 
London, March 14, 1936, p. 313. 
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not. Neither did he demand the immediate military 
assistance from the Locarno guarantors to which his 
government was entitled. Instead, he stated that he 
would accept whatever action the League of Nations 
recommended. This decision implied that France re-
garded the violation as non-flagrant, and restricted 
F f . k' ·1 1 . 4 ranee rom ta ing uni atera action. 
Paul van Zeeland, representing Belgium, spoke at 
the second session which convened on 17 Ma.rch. In his 
speech he elo~uently described the plight of the smaller 
nations of Europe whose security depended upon respect 
for justice and international law. He stressed the need 
for an international structure based on law and respect 
for accepted obligations, and urged the formulation of 
new agreements to replace Locarno. 5 
The third speaker was Maxim Litvinov, the representa-
tive of the Soviet Union. He spoke frankly, stating that 
Germany's verbal attacks.on his country made "circumlocu-
tion and diplomatic niceties" unnecessary. The official 
4 
Wolfers, Britain and France, un. 49,50. 
5 
Goldman, "Crisis in the Rhineland,", o. 268, citing 
League Journal, p. 237. 
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Soviet position called for full support for France, and 
indicated a willingness to accept Germany into the Lea)2;ue 
of Nations. Litvinov, however, denounced Hitler's aggres-
sion, defended the Franco-Soviet Pact, and announced that 
Germany planned to isolate the small nations of Eastern 
Europe, then attack them, one bv one. The new bilateral. 
agreements Hitler proposed, Litvinov charged, would make 
this possible. He also stated that Russia was willing to 
welcome Germany back into the League only when she recog-
nized the principles on which the League was founded. In 
a pointed referer:ice to Germany's behavior, he enumerated 
these principles; the observance of treaties, respect for 
territorial integrity, renunciation of the settlement 
of disputes by the sword, and equality of all members 
of the League. His statements implied that the Physical 
removal of German troops from the ·Rhineland would be a 
6 condition of Germany's acceotance into the Leag;ue. 
Anthony Eden's address on the following day was con-
siderably more conciliatorv than that of the Soviet rep-
resentative. He stated: 
324. 
The breach, however plain, does not carry with 
it any imminent threat of hostilities, and has 
not involved that immediate action for which, in 
6 
Ibid., pp. 269-271, citing League Journal., po. 319-
lL,l 
certain circumstances, the Treaty of Locarno oro-
vides. We happily have time in which to endow our 
action with prudence, as well as the determination, 
which the situation requires. The situation, how-
ever grave, carries with it an opnortunity.7 
The British Foreign Secretary denounced the breach of 
treaty, but insisted that there was no chance of war. By 
publicly eliminating the possibility of hostile action, 
Eden significantly reduced the ability of the League ,of 
Nations to secure a settlement, and indicated to Hitler 
and the rest of the world that the Rhineland was not worth 
fighting for. 
Following Eden, representatives of other Eurooean 
nations made their views known. The Italian representa-
tive indicated his country''s dissatisfaction with League 
sanctions over the Ethiopian affair, and issued a thinly 
veiled threat that unless they were lifted, the Italian 
government would seek an understanding with the govern-
ment of the Reich. Josef Beck, representing Poland, used 
the League meeting as a forum to try to repair relations 
with Germany, and carefully refrained from offering any 
support for the French position. Nicolae Titulescu, 
on the other hand, offered Rumania's full support to the 
French. He warned the League of the possible consequences 
7Ibid., p. 273, citing League Journal, o. 328. 
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if it accepted and legalized what Germany had done. If 
it acquiesced in this violation against the rights of two 
such powerful states as France and Belgium, he asked, what 
are less powerful states to think about the effectiveness 
of the League as an instrument of oeace? He concluded 
that "If the League of Nations emerges from the present 
crisis as the vanquished party, it will represent in the 
future a noble ideal of the past rather than a living 
reality of the pre~ent. 8 
At the suggestion of·Anthony Eden, League members 
agreed to hear a German representative, and on 18 March, 
Joachim von Ribbentrop ~ppeared before the Council. Al-
though he was fluent in English, Ribbentrop addressed the 
gathering in German, interpreted by Paul Schmidt. The • 
German diplomat explained that Germany had long borne the 
burdens of limited sovereignty, but when the Franco-
Soviet Treaty violated Locarno, Hitler had no alternative 
but to secure German territory unilaterally. His country 
had not violated Locarno, he said, because France had 
unilaterally violated it first and it had therefore ceased 
to exist. Ribbentrop further explained that Germany had 
not raised the question of the compatibility of the trea-
ty with Locarno before the League because the problem 
8 
Ibid., pp. 273-276, citing League Journal, DP. 
329-332. 
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was political as well as legal. His country would not 
have been likely to obtain satisfaction in the face of 
French recalcitrance. He added that now Germany was in 
full control of all her territory, and was ready to live 
in peace and friendship with her neighbors. Germany's 
willingness to cooperate in building European solidarity 
lay at the heart of Hitler's foreign policy, he said. 
In spite of Ribbentrop's defense of his country's actions, 
the League Council formally condemned Germany's aggression, 
and adjourned. 
9 
Following adj-ournment of,the League Council, the 
' 
Locarno powers met and- drew up a series of orooosals for 
settling the dispute!. On 20 March the British govern-
ment published them in the .form of a British White Paper, 
announcing the terms under.which Britain, France, Italy, 
(included only as a formality) and Belgiul!l were willing 
to settle the crisis. Theyproposed the following: 
The German Government is invited to oresent its 
argument against the Franco-Soviet mutual 
assistance oact to the Permanent Court of In-
ternational'Justice at The Hague. 
All movement of German troops or war materials 
into the Rhineland would be suspended and a 
limit placed on troops already there. 
9Ibid., pp. 280, 281, citing League Journal, po. 
334-337. 
An international force composed of troops of the 
Locarno Guarantor powers would be stationed in a 
buffer zone in Ger~any along the borders of 
France and Belgium until a new securitv treaty 
was drawn up. The. zone would be 12% miles wide 
paralleling the frontier. German troons would be 
withdrawn fromfue zone. 
' An international commission would be formed to 
supervise the new zone.10 
That same day, the Baldwin government prepared a let-
ter which was to become the formal instrument used to re-
vive the Entente Cordiale. The British government pro-
mised to immediately come to the assistance of the French 
government, in accordance with the Treaty of Locarno, 
in regard to any measures which might be jointly decided 
upon. The letter pledged.that Great Britain would, in 
return for reciorocal measures from the French government, 
take all practical measures to ensure the security of the 
French government, take all practical measures to ensure 
the security of the French nation against unprovoked ag-
gression. The letter really only reaffirmed what Stanlev 
Baldwin had said in 1934, that the British frontier was no 
longer the chalk cliffs of Dover but the Rhine. 
lO"Salvaging Locarno in London," Literary Digest 
ex XI (March 28, 1936): 12. 
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It did not make any provisions for aid to the Eastern 
European allies of France or indicate in any way that 
their security was vital to the peace of Europe. The 
letter was, in the event of the failure of the above 
proposals, to be addressed to both the French and Bel-
gian governments, at which time it would become effec-
. 11 t1.ve. 
When Flandin returned to Paris on the 19th, he was 
convinced that not only had he secured foi France a val-
uable accord with Great Britain, but that "the British 
White Paper constituted a solid. basis fqr negotiations 
which would necessitate .concessions by the Germans. 
The following. day, he addressed the French Chamber and 
shared these convictions. He received a hearty ovation 
when he spoke of the letter of guarantee given him by 
the British government. His faith in the British White 
Paper was voiced in hi•s statement: 
Negotiations on the sub.iect of the new status of 
the Rhineland, and on other subjects, will not be 
opened with Germany until she has expressly accep-
ted all the preliminary conditions which form an 
indivisible whole.12 
11Furnia, Diplomacy, p. 197. 
12 
Goldman, "Crisis in the Rhineland," p. 289. 
146 
His speech was followed by a decision on the part of the 
Chamber to raise the treasury's limits on defense spend-
ing to meet the increased needs brought about by the cri-
sis.13 
Flandin's OJ?timism was short lived. Anthony Eden 
addressed the British Parliament that same day and his 
remarks indicated that the British government did not re-
gard the White Paper as an ultimatum to Hitler. Instead 
it was presented as a ten ta ti ve. plan, In his speech, 
Eden stressed that the British government was not taking 
the side of France, but was acting as a mediator in the 
dispute. 
Flandin made his dissa'tisfaction with Eden's remarks 
known on 23 March thi:iough the French Ambassador in London. 
The Foreign Secretary replied that Franc~ had misunder-
stood the proposals if ·she believed they were binding and 
1 . . l 14 not mere y provisiona .·: 
Primarily as a result of this incident, any agree-
ment or understanding between France and Great Britain 
which had been engendered by the 19 March letter raoidly 
13Ibid. 
14New York Times, March 2Lf, 1936, n. 10. 
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disintegrated and was replaced by ill-feeling and mis-
trust. In an interview with the weekly newspaper Journal 
des Nations, Pierre Flandin expressed his irritation over 
Britain's actions: 
For reasons known only to herself. . Britain 
has taken up the position of umpire in this dis-
pute. From the first, she has not considered her-
self an injured party in the same position of 
France but has assumed the role of mediator. Whose 
fault will it be if the rising generation reflects 
only the bitterness resulting from Britain's fail-
ing us at every turn? If in a case like this, where 
we are defending the. rights of everyone, we are 
obliged to make an isolated stand, can the Franco-
British entepte possibly stand such a test?l5 
' 
Adolph Hitler was certainly a~are of the disunity 
which plagued the western democracies, and realized that 
concessions on his part would not likely be necessary. It 
was to his advantage to let time pass. As the days went 
by the chances that action would be taken to reverse the 
coup grew increasingly remote. Consequently, Germany 
issued lengthy proposals and took her time in studying 
the proposals of the other powers. On 1 April, Ribben-
trop present~d a memorandum to the British government. 
It explained Germany's action in the Rhineland once again, 
and answered the British White Paper of 20 March. The 
memorandum repeated the Reich's criticism of the Franco-
Soviet Pact, and even claimed that the demilitarized zone 
15 
Ibid., March 26, 1936, p. 14 
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had never been voluntarily accepted. The memorandum stated 
that the Rhineland clauses had been incorporated into the 
Locarno treaty only after the Ruhr was forcibly occupied 
and German territorial integrity violated. It also de-
clared that the creation of the demilitarized zone had 
been illegal in the first place, because Woodrow Wilson's 
Fourteen Points did not intend that Germany's sovereignty 
in the Rhineland be restricted. The memorandum rejected 
the proposal for bringin~- the question before the court 
at The Hague, because the· court could only .iudge legal, 
not political, matters. 16 
A nineteen ~ point German Peace Plan was contained in 
the memorandum. It was primarily a reiteration of the Ger-
man offer of 7 March, and-included the proposals for a 
twenty-five year security pact between Germany and her 
eastern neighbors, a promise to rejoin the League of Na-
tions if her proposals were accepted, and a pledge to 
limit her western frontier fortifications if the French 
and Belgians did the same. But it also called for a four-
month negotiating period during which Germany would not 
increase the number of troops in the Rhineland or move 
them nearer the frontier. It was also suggested that an 
international commission be set up to verify this, pro-
16Goldman, "Crisis in the Rhineland," pp. 371, 372. 
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vided that the French and Belgian governments would agree 
to restrict 'similar activity in their own countries. The 
plan also called for a Franco-German agreement on "moral 
disarmament" and a special court of arbitration to rule 
on the various aspects of such an agreement. 17 
The French reaction was the same as it had been on 
7 March. The government of France could not understand 
why a twenty-five year pact was necessary to replace one 
of infinite duration, apd once again expressed concern 
that bilateral pacts with Eastern European nations might 
allow Hitler to a:bsorb those· countries one at a time 
while the others were !;telpless to prevent it. The French 
government reiterated its opposition to limiting forti-
fications on the Franco~Gerrnan border, pointing out that 
this would mean dismantling the Maginot Line. 18 
The British government regarded the German memorandum 
as a refusal of the conditions set forth in the British 
White Paper. Consequently, the Prime Minister transmit-
ted the March 19 letter to the French and Belgian govern-




New York Times, April 2, 1936, p. 21. 
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effect. The British intended this move to show Hitler 
that they were displeased with his proposals, and to show 
France and Belgium that they·would stand by them. They 
also decided to begin arrangements for military staff 
talks. The French had been pressing them to do this, 
19 and there now seemed no reason to delay any longer. 
British public opinion was immediately hostile to 
military stqff talks, and Anthony Eden spoke to the Bri-
tish Parliament on -the_ suj:>ject. He tried to make the 
talks seem palatable by explaining that Britain was ob-
ligated to France and Belgium and had a proud history 
of not going back on her commitments. For those who were 
concerned about British involvement in'the wars of their 
neighbors across the channel, Eden made it plain that the 
staff talks would be strictly limited and clearly defined. 
"They are purely technical conversations. They can in no 
measure increase our political obligations - in no mea-
sure. 11 
20 
Eden had been forced by the pacifism and anti-
French sentiment within his country to assure critics of 
19 
Furnia, Diplomacy, p. 197. 
20 
Goldman, "Crisis in the Rhineland," p. 3 76. 
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the government that the military staff conversations would 
not commit Great Britain to any overt action against Ger-
many. In a sense this nullified the value of the talks 
themselves. By totally disallowing the possibility of 
joint military action, Eden and his government eliminated 
any chances of ousting the German troous from the Rhineland. 
On 15 April, tripartite conversations among the Bri-
tish, French and Belgian Chiefs of Staff began. In the 
course of the two-4ay meetings'thev discussed naval, air 
and ground strateg_ies and strengths, and laid the founda-
,, 
tion for military collaboration in the event of a German 
attack. 21 
In the meantime the French cabinet apuroved a reuly 
to the German memorandum of 1 April along with a group of 
counter-proposals labeled the French Peace Plan. The two 
statements were submitted formally to the Locarno powers 
on 8 April, in Geneva and afterwards to the Lea,gue Council. 
The first of the statements was a severe indictment of Ger-
many's rearmament of the Rhineland and the proposals that 
went with it. The French refuted the German contention 
i 
that the Ruhr occupation had forced the Germans into Lo-
carno, declaring that the Ruhr had been evacuated before 
21Eden, Facing, p. 417. 
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the negotiations even began. Germany's offer to join 
the League was questioned as well. How could Germany, 
after violating international agreements, fulfill the 
conditions of the League Convenant which said that scrup-
ulous respect for all treaty agreements is necessary for 
22 peace? 
The French plan for peace was a general call for 
harmony and unity based on the League of Nations and aimed 
at a united and secure' Europe. It called ·•for an inter-
national commission controlled by the League, with armed 
forces at its disposal. 23 The plan n11t forth by the French 
government is virtually a reaffirmation ,of Woodrow Wilson's 
Fourteen Points and clearly illustrates the degree to 
which collective secur~ty and League action had permeat,ed 
French diplomacy. Totally devoid of concrete proposals, 
it illustrates the wishful thinking and lack of resolve 
which was characteristic of the French leadershin in 1936. 
The Locarno Powers met in Geneva on 10 April, at 
which time Flandin exolained the proposals and defended 
the French government's s ta temen ts agi.ins t charges that 
they were counter-productive and hamoered negotiations. 
22Goldman, "Crisis in the Rhineland," pn. 380, 381. 
23 rbid. 
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Flandin argued that the failure of the Germans to accent 
the proposals of 19 March clearly indicated that neaceful 
settlement was impossible, and that it was time to carry 
out sanctions against Germany. Eden disagreed, maintain-
ing that a negotiated settlement was still Possible, and 
promised the French Foreign Minister that he would attemnt 
to get Hitler to clarify the 1 April memorandum. His plan 
was to submit a detailed questionnaire to the German gov-
ernment which woul~ by the directness o.f the questions 
educate public opinion even if Hitler ref.us_ed to reoly. 24 
The resulting questionnaire was presented in Berlin 
on 7 May, but fo"):' more than a week, Hitler refused to 
accept it. ·rn the meantime, the press 'learned of the ' . 
questions and published 'them before the German Chancellor 
had officially received the document. The questionnaire 
began by stating that the;British government found it 
regrettable that Germany had hot made a "more substantial 
contribution" to a settlement, and declared that there 
was a need to achieve the "greatest possible precision" 
so that negotiations could succeed. Therefore, the gov-
ernment of Great Britain wished to put some questions to 
the German 12;overnment regarding the 1 Aoril memorandum. 25 
24Eden, Facing, p. 419. 
25 rbid. 
The first question asked whether Hitler was in a 
position to conclude genuine treaties. The next asked 
whether the German government drew any distinction be-
tween the Reich and the German nation. Eden included 
this question because he wanted it made clear whether or 
not Hitler considered himself the ruler or protector of 
German speaking peoples who lived outside the boundaries 
of Germany. If he had such claims, Eden believed the 
world should be aware of them. Other questions asked 
whether Germany would_ respect Eurooe's political and 
territorial status, and if the non-aggression pacts pro-
posed by the .Germans could be-extended to include Russia, 
. 26 
Latvia and Estonia. 
On llr May, Sir Eric,_Phipps, the _British Ambassador 
to Germany, f~nally secured an interview with the Chance-
llor. Phipps reported to Eden that it was a lengthy ti-
rade of little substance, and that Hitler refused to re-
ply until the new French government was installed. 27 
The French elections of 3 May resulted in the replace-
ment of Prime Minister Albert Sarraut and Foreign Minister 
Fland.in with Leon Blum and Yvon Delbos, but even after 




Ibid., p. 420. 
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the fact that he had promised to reply when the new gov-
ernment took over. On 18 June, Eden stated in Parliament 
that Germany's failure to answer the questionnaire had 
shown that Britain's attempts at mediation had been un-
successful. He declared that everyone wanted Germany's 
reassurance that the existing territorial status of Europe 
would be respected. Once the Germans had agreed on this 
point, a permanent settlement based on the disappearance 
of the demilitarized zone could be made. He added that 
' . . 
the government hoped Germany would reply to the question-
naire of 6 May so that Europe would know Germany's inten-
tions and progress toward peace could be continued. 28 
The Foreign Secretary knew that Germany was forti-
fying the Rhineland, and he "knew that once the fortifica-
tions were comnleted the French would never agree to neg-
29 
otiate. Whether Eden pressed this issue or not, nego-
tiations were finished. The fact that he chose not to 
attempt to pressure the German Chancellor on this point 
indicated that he had decided to accept fortification of 
the zone. The only alternative was military intervention, 
a step never seriously under consideration by his govern-
28Goldman, "Crisis in the Rhineland," pp. 390, 391. 
29Eden, Facing, p. 420. 
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ment. Had he informed the French, it is doubtful that 
they would have forced the issue either. As soon as Blum 
took office, his government was plagued by strikes and 
economic difficulties. Blum concluded that the best 
course of action was to accept the unfortunate circum-
stances and to go along with the British who sought a 
peaceful settlement. 30 
The kind of pressures which the Blum government 
faced were well illustrated by a conference of the Un-
ion of French Teachers at Lille in July. The 800,000 
member union passed a resolution which indicates the 
strength of pacifism in France in 1936. Their state-
ment said, in part: 
Slavery is preferable to war. We can recov-
er from slavery, perhaps, but· never from war. . 
There is no conceivable cause for which the French 
nation should take up arms.31 
On 23 July, representatives of Great Britain, France 
and Belgium met in London and publicly recognized Hitler's 
reoccupation of the Rhineland. Although a few more futile 
attempts to achieve a negotiated settlement would be made 
during the next few months, the representatives of the 
democracies had accepted the reality of the German pre-
sence in the Rhineland and acquiesced to the fact that the 
30Goldman, pp. 393, 394. 
31 Ibid., p. ·405. 
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troops were there to stay. At the London meeting a 
communique was issued which spoke of the "situation crea-
ted by the German initiative of the 7th March," the same 
subject which had been called in previous months "the 
brutal repudiation of international agreements." This 
change in phraseology reflected the position of the Blum 
government. There was little the new Premier could do 
to reverse the blunders of his predecessors. He be-
lieved history woul'd hlame them,·not him: ·ne had no 
other alternative, short of a majcir military offensive 
against a refortified Rhineland, and his countrymen would 
not support such a move. As Germany rearmed the Rhine-
land, with e~ch gun they installed, and each structure 
that was erected, the French alliance system grew more an<l 
more meaningless, and France's international prestige dim-
inished accordingly. Once France accented the remilitar-
ization of the Rhineland, she became increasingly depen-
dent upon British foreign oolicy and military support. 
Eventually this capitulation would bring her full circle, 
from the cornerstone of a firm alliance system with the 
Eastern European nations to her role as one of the four 
nations which presided over the destruction of Czechoslo-
vakia at Munich in 1938. Ironically, the finale of the 
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Rhineland crisis did not even receive the dignity of a 
conference, a vote, or even a memorandum. It simoly be-
came a part of the European diplomacy of appeasement, the 
first step on the road that would lead to Munich in 1938 
and to war in 1939. 
CONCLUSION 
The remilitarization of the Rhineland wrought sev-
eral distinct changes in the European international sit-
uation. Strategically, France was blocked from rendering 
aid to Poland and the nations of the Little Entente. As 
long as the Rhineland remained demilitarized, France 
could, in the event_ of a. German attack on her Eastern 
European Allies, invade'Germany through the Rhineland and 
inflict a serious,··{f·not .fatal, .blow, This capacity 
was not only a very strong deterrent against such an 
attack, it also carried the prospect of prompt and effec-
tive aid if such an attack did occur. An important conse-
quence of remilitarization was that the French lost that 
capacity. Once German. tro.ops occupied th·e zone and fort-
ified the border, France could accomplish nothing without 
breaking through the fortificati_ons. Such a delay could 
result in an Ally begin overrun before France could do 
them any good. 
Strategically, the alliances had been rendered un-
workable, but the impact upon the morale of the Eastern 
European nations was perhaps even more devastating. This 
is all the more tragic given the fact that when Hitler 
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struck, these nations indicated their willingness to march 
in the defense of France. France never requested the aid 
of her Eastern European Allies, and therefore her failure 
to take action cannot be blamed on them. The Rhineland 
crisis clearly pointed up the fact that to be effective, 
alliances must be backed by the will to act. Following 
that episode the nations of Eastern Europe became convinced 
that the man11er in which France dealt with threats to her 
own security gave little assurance of ,supl)ort should their 
security be threatened. They felt abandoned, and began 
to turn away from France, seeking friends wherever they 
could find them. Recognizing that Germany's growing might 
would soon make her the dominant oower in Central Europe, 
the Eastern European nations attempted·to come to terms 
with the Third Reich. During the next few years Austria 
and Czechoslovakia were incorporated into the German sphere, 
while Hungary ·and Rumania became more closely associated 
with Germany, both economically and politically. Faced 
with the steady deterioration of her former grand al-
liance system, France began to disassociate herself from 
the problems of Eastern Europe and to look steadily to-
ward Great Britain for leadership in diplomatic .affairs. 
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After France accepted the remilitarization of the 
Rhineland, she became more and more dependent upon Bri-
tish foreign policy and military support. This revival 
of Anglo-French s?lidarity was more a confirmation of 
mutual weakness than an alignment of strong resolve, and 
it resulted in two casual ties .. · Belgium, uncertain of any 
continuing benefits from a French alliance, once again as-
sumed the cloak of neutrality, a move that would not long 
protect her from the winds of German aggression. The So-
viet Union, already contemptuous of the western democra-
cies, became increasingly dissatisfied with the Anglo-
Ften:ch policy of appeasement and entered into a non-aggression 
pact with Germany in 1939. 
The Rhineland crisis also had a rather critical do-
mestic result for Adolph Hitler. Although the military 
plans for the Rhineland action called for a fighting with-
drawal if there was an armed counteraction from me west, 
• 
Hitler had opposed the inclusion of such a ulan. ~fuen his 
generals insisted, he seemed to give in on the point. The 
success of the coup, which had been carried out in spite 
of the misgivings of the German military hierarchy, changed 
the relationship between Hitler and his military advisors. 
He became convinced of his own ability to master any sit-
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uation and contemptuous of the caution shown by the Gen-
erals. As the Fuhrer said, "With dictators, nothing suc-
ceeds like success." 1 Adolph Hitler, who had acted against 
the counsel of his closest military advisors became confi-
dent that he could assume even greater risks, disregard 
cautious advice, and triumph by bluff until he could 
conquer by force. 
The risk Hitler took might have ended his career had 
his bluff been called. In his book The Gathering Storm, 
Winston Churchill states that "If the French government 
had mobilized, there. is no doubt that Hitler would have been 
compelled by his own General Staff to withdraw, and a 
check would have been given to his pretensions which might 
" well have proved fatal to his rule. This supposition 
cannot be proven, but it is logical to surmise that had 
the French reacted forcefully and succeeded in driving 
the Germans from the Rhineland, even if Hitler had re-
mained in power, he would likely have been more cautious 
in the future. Perhaps then Germany's desire for equality 
in international affairs could have been dealt with at 
the negotiating table instead of on the battlefield. In-
stead, the failure of Britain and France to stop Hitler's 
1,meeler-Rennett, The Nemesis of Power, o. 353. 
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treaty violations when they had the power to do so con-
vinced him that they were not likely to stop him from car-
rying out his plans in the future. 
The remilitarization of the Rhineland was not an iso-
lated incident, or a chance encounter. It was part of a 
preconceived plan on the part of Adolph Hitler to secure 
"living space." He prepared for it by carefully rearm-
ing. After the Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935, he 
had the tacit approval of Great·Britain to rearm, even 
though it was prohibited by treaty. He announced a return 
to conscription, and left the League of Nations without in-
cident. These successes led him to tear up the Versailles 
and Locarno agreements by reoc~upying the Rhineland at a 
time when Great Britain and France were at odds over 
Italian aggression. 
The French government maintained that the Rhineland 
was essential to its security. Why then did France not 
expel the troops from the zone? The fearful risk of war, 
the strong possibility that Great Britain would not assist 
them, the reluctance of the military chiefs and a strongly 
pacifist public opinion all contributed heavily to the 
French decision to appeal to the League of Nations. Once 
the French turned away from the possibility of direct 
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action and to the machinery of the League of Nations, they 
greatly reduced the possibility of removing the German hold 
on the Rhineland. 
Great Britain must share responsibility for the de-
cision to resort to League action. Throughout the crisis, 
British officials urged their French counterparts to exer-
cise caution and to keep their heads. The British govern-
ment responded to public opinion and skirted its role as a 
guarantor of the Locarno treaty. She attempted to fulfill 
' 
her Locarno obligation by guaranteeing French and Belgian 
borders and then sliding into the role of mediator in the 
dispute, but she had agreed to guarantee not just the bor-
ders of Belgium and France, but the demilitarized zone of 
the Rhineland as well. Clearly, the British cannot remain 
blameless, but their role was as a guarantor; initiative 
on 7 March indeed rested with the French. Could the Bri-
tish government, whose people did not support military 
action, be expected to give it to France, when the French 
themselves appeared palsied by pacifism and blind faith 
in their Maginot Line? 
In defending their actions during the crisis, the 
British maintained that they were not adequately prepared 
militarily to undertake an offensive, and that time was 
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needed to beef up Great Britain's armed capabilities. This 
tactic of playing for time failed to take into account the 
fact that while they rearmed, the Germans did likewise, 
and that regaining sovereignty in the Rhineland gave them 
the industrial wherewithal to do so. 
By failing to oust the Germans from the Rhineland, 
France and Great Britain sowed the seeds of war. By 
attempting to negotiate with Adolph Hitler they set the 
precedent of appeasement that was to result in the Munich 
conference of 1938. 
The term "Munich" has become synonomous with capitula-
tion and appeasement, ·for it was there that Great Britain 
and France presided over the destruction of Czechoslovakia., 
an event many historians regard as a turning point in the 
history of the inter-war years. Yet it was in the Rhine-
land two years earlier that the precedent was set for this 
capitulation. It can therefore be concluded that the Rhine-
land crisis was much more than ·a harbinger of Munich, it . . 






Treaty of Versailles 
Part III Section III 
Article 42. Germany is forbidden to maintain or 
construct any for"tifications either on the left bank of 
the Rhine or on the right bank to the west of a line 
drawn 50 kilometers to the east of the Rhine. 
Article 43. In the area defined_ above the main-
tenance and the assembly of armed forces, either perm-
anently or temporarily,· and military manoeuvres of any 
kind, as well as the upkeep of all permanent works of 
mobilization, are in the same way forbidden. 
Article L,4. In case Germany violates in any manner 
whatever the provisions of Articles 4-2 and L,3, she shall 
be regarded as committing a hostile act against the pow-
ers signatory of the present treaty· and as calculated to 
disturb the peace of the world. 
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APPENDIX C 
Treaty of Locarno 
Article 1. The high contracting parties collectively 
and severally guarantee . the observance of the stip-
ulations of articles 42 and 43 of the said treaty (Ver-· 
sailles) concerning the demilitarized zone. 
Article 2. Germany and Belgium, and also Germany 
and France, mutually undertake that they will not attack 
or invade each other or resort to war against each other. 
This stipulation shall not, however, apply in the case of--
The exercise of the right of legitimate defense, 
that is to say, resistance to a violation of the 
undertaking contained in the previous paragraph 
or to a flagrant breach of articles 4·2 and 43 of 
the said Treaty of Versailles, if such breach con-
stitutes an unprovoked act of ~ggression and by rea-
son of the assembly of armed forces in the demili-
tarized zone immediate action is necessary. 
Article 4. 
1. If one of the high contracting parties alleges 
that a violation of article 2 of the present treaty or a 
breach of articles 42 or 43 of the.Tr~aty of Versailles 
has been or is being committed, it shall bring the ques-
tion at once before the Council of the League of Nations. 
2. As soon as the Council of the League of Nations 
is satisfied that such violation or breach has been com-
mitted, it will notify its findings without delay to the 
powers signatory of the present treaty, who.severally 
agree that in such case they will each of them come im-
mediately to the assistance of the power against whom the 
act complained of is directed. 
3. In case of a flagrant violation of the nresent 
treaty or of a flagrant breach of articles 42 or 43 of 
the Treaty of Versailles by one of the high contracting 
parties, each of the other contracting parties hereby 
169 
undertakes immediately to come to the help of the party 
against whom such a violation or breach has been directed 
as soon as the said power has been able to satisfy itself 
that by reason either of the crossing of the frontier or 
of the outbreak of hostilities or of the assembly of armed 
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